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ABSTRACT 
In Part I the institutional factors affecting water distribution in the Upper 
Colorado River Basin in general and specifically the Uintah Basin are presented. The 
historical development of the appropriation doctrine of water allocation is outlined 
and Utah water policy is examined. These institutional factors are analyzed in light of 
the prototype oil shale development in the Uintah Basin and potential impact on the 
area's agricultural sector. Oil shale water estimates are compared with Uintah Basin 
water availability and examined with regard to population projections and municipal 
water use. Lastly, Utah water policy and the appropriation doctrine are viewed as 
restraints to efficient water transfers. 
In Part II irrigation water is treated as a random variable. Its actual quantity is 
not known ahead of time. If transfers of water to oil shale production affect the 
variability of water used in agriculture then there will be impacts in agriculture even if 
the farmers receive the same average quantity of water as originally. These impacts 
are analyzed in the context of the expected utility maximization hypothesis, i.e., the 
farmers are hypothesized to maximize expected utility. The measure of an increase in 
variability is the "mean prese.rving spread." The analyses seek to determine the 
impact upon expected (average) real income (utility), expected profits (net farm 
income), purchased inputs, the price of water, and the price of land. The analyses are 
conducted for both the case where the farmers are risk neutral and the case where 
they are risk averse. 
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PREFACE 
The so-called energy crisis produced renewed interest in national self-sufficiency 
in energy production, a new look at "unconventional" energy sources such as oil 
shale, tar sands, and coal gasification and liquefaction, and a spate of governmental 
initiatives to encourage development. 
The northeast section of Utah (the Uintah Basin) is a part of the rich oil shale 
belt, and with the government leasing of two prototype sites on the White River 
known as U a and Ub, it was believed by many people that oil shale development was 
imminent. Studies were made of the water needs of an oil shale industry and 
agricultural producers became threatened because they are the big users of water in 
the area. 
This study assesses the water situation in the Uintah Basin and explores the 
likely effects of development of the prototype lease sites on agriculture. The study 
consists of two parts: (1) An analysis of the current water demand-supply situation in 
the area and the projected impact of oil shale development with particular emphasis 
on agriculture, and (2) an analysis of the effects on farm production decisions of 
increasing the variability of water deliveries resulting from water transfers. The first 
part deals generally with the quantities of water available for agricultural production 
while the second deals with issues that arise when the variability of those quantities is 
increased even if the annual quantity of irrigation water available is unaffected. 
This study was financed by a grant from the Office of Water Research and 
Technology under its Title I Allotment Program. Gardner and Tew were responsible 
for Part I dealing with the current demand supply situation and Lyon wrote Part II on . 
the effects of increasing the variability of water supplies to irrigators. 
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PART I 
THE IMPACTS OF THE PROTOTYPE OIL SHALE 
DEVELOPMENT ON AGRICULTURAL AND 
MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLIES 
INTRODUCTION 
It has often been alleged that the development 
of the arid western United States has been limited 
by the lack of water. The amount of that resource 
available has dictated agricultural production and 
the location of settlements. 
Recent years have witnessed large price 
increases in energy, and the nation is searching for 
new forms that are economically feasible and 
environmentally acceptable. As a result, much 
attention is being focused on the development 'of 
alternatives to liquid petroleum. 
Oil shale is one of the most abundant but 
undeveloped forms of energy in the United States. 
High grade deposits, located within the Green 
River formation of Utah, Colorado, and Wyoming 
(Upper Colorado River Basin), contain the 
equivalent of 600 billion barrels of oil. Exploitation 
of this' resource would offer a significant supple-
ment to U.S. supplies of liquid petroleum. Studies 
of the feasibility of oil shale indicate that the 
availability of large quantities of water will play a 
key role in determining to what extent an oil shale 
industry can become a reality. 
It is apparent that the legal right to utilize 
water will be perhaps the most important factor in 
the consideration of water for energy in the Upper 
Colorado River Basin. From available data it is 
obvious that present water availability exceeds that 
which is presently utilized' in the basin. However, it 
is also apparent that this quantity of water is in 
turn exceeded by present rights granted by most 
states in the area. The obvious conclusion is that 
many appropriative rights granted to private 
parties are not being fully utilized. Nonetheless, 
these ,rights remain as charges against the future 
availability of water in the oil shale rich areas. How 
state water control agencies reconcile current water 
1 
administration policies with the need for energy 
water will determine to a large extent if oil shale 
operations will become a reality. 
Since the bulk of existing water rights in the 
Upper Colorado River Basin is associated with 
agriculture, there has been some concern that 
increased energy water demands will have a 
detrimental impact on the area's agriculture. In 
attempting to assess the impact of oil shale 
development upon existing agricultural water 
supplies, this report will focus upon three principal 
areas of investigation: 
1. To examine the current Utah water 
policies, laws, regulations, as well as other factors 
which are affecting the development of the state's 
water resources. Much of the legislation governing 
water use and development in Utah also incorpo-
rates aspects of broader, regional policies, such as 
the Colorado River Compact and the Upper 
Colorado River Compact. Therefore, water policies 
will be investigated from a multi-state or regional 
viewpoint as well as from the vantage point of 
Utah's own water policies. Primary emphasis will 
be placed upon the legislation and problems 
dealing with the Upper Colorado River Basin. 
2. To examine the oil shale development 
firms, the mining and retorting processes, and the 
associated water requirements. Likely alternatives 
for obtaining water for oil shale will also be 
studied. 
3. To evaluate the impact of . oil shale 
development on agriculture. The geographic area 
of study will be the Uintah Basin in general and the 
Ashley Valley-Vernal City area specifically. Popu-
lation impacts in the Uintah Basin, water sources 
for the basin and Ashley Valley, and the restraints 
which exist regarding oil shale's use of agricultural 
water will be examined. 
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The study presumes that oil shale development 
will reach only the prototype stage of development 
in the near future. This represents a capacity of 
approximately 100,000 barrels/day. 
FACTORSAFFECTUNGCURRENT 
STATE WATER POLICY 
Introduction 
The very nature of the prior appropriation 
doctrine is one of extensive institutional involve-
ment in the allocation of water. The scarcity of 
water throughout the west has prompted the 
enactment of several major interstate and inter-
national compacts. 
Nowhere is this situation more apparent than 
with the Colorado River, quite possibly the most 
regulated waterway in the world. The legislation, 
compacts, treaties, and other agreements which 
govern the Colorado River system are known 
collectively as the "Law of the River." 
It is obvious, therefore, that allocation of 
Utah's water resources will be done within this 
institutional framework. Energy development will 
have to compete with other demands for the state's 
valuable water resources. 
The purpose of this section is to explore the 
regulations of the Colorado River system, explain 
the appropriate doctrine as it relates to the State of 
Utah, identify the competing demands for water 
within the state, and present the current factors 
and proposals affecting the development of a 
state-wide water policy. 
The Colorado River System . 
The cornerstone of the body of law regulating 
the Colorado River is the Colorado River Compact 
of 1922. The parties involved are the federal 
government, the states of Utah, Colorado, Arizona, 
New Mexico, Wyoming, Nevada, and California. 
The primary purpose of the compact is to distribute 
the United States entitlement of flow of the river 
equally between the upper basin states (Utah, 
Colorado, Wyoming, and New Mexico) and the 
lower basin states (Arizona, California, and 
Nevada). Based upon pre-1920 data, the compact 
established the total flow of the river available for 
distribution among the upper and lower basin 
states at 15 million acre feet (mat). The major 
provision of the compact is one requiring the 
upper basin states to deliver a minimum of 75 maf 
to the lower basin states in any consecutive 10-year 
period. The Mexican Water treaty of 1944 
guarantees Mexico an annual quantity of 1,500,000 
3 
acre feet of water from any and all sources (USDI, 
1974). 
While the 1922 compact regulates the river as 
to the allotment between the upper and lower 
basins, it does not divide the water between the 
individual states of each area. The Upper Basin 
Compact of 1948 (USDI, 1974) allocates the water 
to the four participating states of the upper basin 
on a percentage basis in the following manner 
(USDI, 1974): 
Colorado 
Utah 
New Mexico 
Wyoming 
51.7% 
23.00/0 
11.25% 
14.0% 
(Note: Arizona is guaranteed an annual flow of 
50,000 acre feet from the upper basin allotment.) 
A major problem with the original Colorado 
River Compact and the subsequent Upper Basin 
Compact is that information upon which the initial 
river flow was calculated was greatly overestimated 
and the later Mexican Treaty obligations had not 
been defined. Later years have shown that the 
river's total flow at Lee Ferry is closer to 13.3 maf 
than the original estimate of 15 maf (USDI, 1974). 
Therefore, the upper basin's entitlement is 
approximately 5.8 maf after fulfilling the lower 
basin's flow requirements, which are still held at 75 
maf in any given 10-year period. However, it is the 
variability of the flow which has required the upper 
basin states to develop considerable storage 
capacity in order to reduce the effect of variability. 
(This was the motivating force behind the Colorado 
River Storage Project which included Glen Canyon 
Dam and Flaming Gorge Dam.) 
Based upon the more accurate estimate of the 
total river flow (Noble, 1974), the percentage 
division of the upper basin's allotment entitles the 
four states to the following amounts of water: 
Colorado 
Utah 
Wyoming 
New Mexico 
2,976,000 af 
1,322,000 af 
805,000 af 
627,000 af 
It should be noted, however, that the above 
data are based upon Bureau of Reclamation 
estimates. The State of Utah generally takes a more 
liberal view with regards to its entitlement, and 
places the figure around 1.4 maf. It is that estimate 
which will be utilized in this study. Also, the 
Colorado River proper does not flow through Utah 
. for any great distance. Nonetheless, 15 percent of 
the virgin flow of the river at Lee Ferry does 
originate in Utah (Lawrence and Saunders, 1975). 
II 
Before outlining Utah's current and projected 
uses of the state's Colorado River allotment, 
mention should be made of the appropriative 
doctrine, which underpins all water-related devel-
opment, and the statutory manner in which water 
rights are obtained. 
HIstorical 
The early water users in the west were 
generally miners and farmers who often trespassed 
upon the public domain to divert water from 
streams to the point of use. Because of the lack of 
courts and established local procedure regarding 
the use of water, these early inhabitants developed 
their own local customs. They were usually related 
to the same rules which governed mining districts 
and claims. 
When water-use conflicts did reach the courts, 
the decisions tended to reflect these local 
characteristics rather than the traditional riparian 
views. The development of the west was dependent 
upon successful farming and mining and these 
activities were dependent upon water. Therefore, 
the courts and the Congress, recognizing the 
importance of such development, allowed water to 
be withdrawn by anyone who could put it to · a 
beneficial use in accordance with the laws and 
customs of the respective states. Thus the law of 
prior appropriation was born. 
The essentials of the concept are that water 
rights are acquired through the diverting of water 
from a natural watercourse and applying it to a 
beneficial use. This water right has a priority date 
which reflects the date that action was first taken to 
utilize the water. This priority establishes a 
relationship between a particular water right and 
all other water users on the stream. Those rights 
superior (earlier) are guaranteed their water supply 
before the needs of those inferior (later) can be 
met. 
The appropriation doctrine in Utah developed 
in slightly different fashion than those areas where 
water rules were related to mining claims. The 
Mormon pioneers were the first Anglo-Saxons to 
practice irrigation on an extensive scale in the 
United States. Their colonization patterns involved 
the establishment of many small communities 
generally separated from each other by miles of 
desert and mountains and as a result were largely 
self-contained. The development of a cooperative-
type irrigation system under church control was 
usually one of the first activities of any new 
settlement. 
The Mormon Church contemplated the 
colonization of the Great Basin in such a way as to 
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maximize the use of the area's sc~rce water 
resources. This use would be applied to all land 
that could be reached by the water-not just those 
areas contiguous to the surface water channels. 
The church took possession of the region and 
supervised the allotments of parcels of land to 
settlers. These early rights were recognized by the 
Mormon State of Deseret and the Territory of Utah 
pending issuance of formal land titles by the 
United States. It was also established that those 
who had first made beneficial use of water should 
be entitled to continued use in preference to those 
who came later. This fundamental principle was to 
be later sanctioned by the legislature and the courts 
(Dewsnup and Jensen, 1973). 
These early methods were terminated with 
statehood when the legislature provided that an 
appropriation could only be obtained through 
filing an application with the State Engineer. 
(Note: Those who owned rights prior to 1903 but 
had not yet perfected those rights in terms of 
putting the water to beneficial use were given a 
reasonable amount of time to do so. Of course, 
those who had claim to water based upon pre-1903 
action still held title to the water.) 
This 1903 statute was revised and reenacted in 
1905 and again in 1919. The 1919 law is the basis of 
the present enactment contained in the Utah Code 
Annotated (1953). 
The Utah Appropriation statute contains the 
following declaration: "All waters in this state, 
whether above or under the ground are hereby 
declared to be the property of the public, subject to 
all existing rights to the use thereof." (73-1-1) 
"Rights to the use of the unappropriated public 
waters in this state may be acquired only as 
provided in this title " (73-3-1) (Hutchins, 1965). 
The current laws, therefore, declare that the 
state has the right to control the diversion and 
distribution of the public waters within its 
boundaries. The control of the diversion and 
distribution of such public waters are vested in the 
State Engineer, subject to judicial review and to the 
constitutional provision recognizing and confirm·· 
ing existing rights to the use of waters for useful 
and beneficial purposes (Dewsnup and Jensen, 
1973). The statutes clearly make it the duty of the 
state to appropriate the water in a manner that will 
be in the best interests of the public. 
This statutory procedure is now the exclusive 
method of appropriating water. Applications to 
appropriate are filed in the office of the State 
Engineer, and unappropriated water may be 
acquired for any recognized beneficial use. Subject 
to compliance with the statutory procedure for 
perfecting a water right, an application has priority 
as of the date it was filed in the State Engineer's 
office (Dewsnup and Jensen, 1973). 
The laws state that it is the duty of the State 
Engineer to approve an application that meets the 
filing requirements if: (a) there is unappropriated 
water in the proposed source; (b) the proposed use 
will not impair existing rights or interfere with 
more beneficial use of the water; (c) the proposed 
plan is physically and economically feasible and not 
detrimental to the public welfare; and (d) the 
applicant has the financial ability to complete the 
proposed works and has applied for the appropria-
tion in good faith and not for speculation or 
monopoly. ' However, if the State Engineer has 
reason to believe that more beneficial use of the 
water for irrigation, domestic, stockwatering, 
power, mining, or manufacturing purposes will be 
interfered with or the public welfare will be 
adversely affected, he must withhold approval or 
rejection pending an investigation (Hutchins, 
1965). 
Once an application is approved, the applicant 
is given a specific time in which to place the water 
to beneficial use and submit written proof of 
appropriation. An applicant may be granted 
additional time for completing construction of the 
works and applying the water to beneficial use 
upon a showing of diligence or reasonable cause for 
delay (The Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Sec. 
73-3-12). If an application lapses for failure of the 
applicant to comply with the provisions of the act, 
the State Engineer may, upon showing of 
reasonable cause, reinstate the application. How-
ever, the priority date of the application must be 
altered to reflect the date of reinstatement (The 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Sec. 73-3-18). 
Once the water is placed to beneficial use, the 
applicant submits proof of his actions and is issued 
a certificate of appropriation, which is filed in 
the ' State. Engineer's office. Domestic purposes, 
stockwater, irrigation, municipal power, manufac-
turing, fish culture, and the use of navigable water 
for the recovery of salt and the minerals have all 
been classified as beneficial use of state waters. 
A certificate of appropriation constitutes 
prima facie evidence of the water right. The right 
consists not only in the amount of the appropria-
tion but also in the priority. It also extends to 
quality as well as quantity. A water right is 
considered as a species of real property and is 
protected as such. It is a usufructuary right, 
meaning the right to divert from the source of 
supply. Lastly, a water right in Utah is separate 
and distinct from the land upon which it is used. 
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However, if a deed transferring land does not 
specify otherwise, the water right passes with title 
to the land (The Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Sec. 
73-1-11). 
Current water uses 
Utilizing the administrative mechanism just 
outlined, Utah is currently depleting the Colorado 
River by 825,000 acre feet annually (Hansen, 
1975). Approximately 90 percent of the current 
diversions are related to agriculture, with 5 percent 
for municipal and industrial purposes, and 5 
percent for managed wetlands. Of the municipal 
and industrial uses, about 7,800 acre feet are 
utilized in the production of thermal power 
(Lawrence and Saunders, 1975). 
Although it would appear that nearly 600,000 
acre feet are still available for the state to allocate, 
the current situation is one of strong competition 
for the remaining water. The following pages will 
discuss the problems facing Utah in allocating the 
state's remaining Colorado River allotment among 
the most likely water users. 
Over-appropriation 
A common statement made regarding the 
Colorado River is that it is over-appropriated. As 
was previously mentioned, Utah currently utilizes 
825,000 acre feet of the state's entitlement, leaving 
some 600,000 acre feet available. According to 
state officials this amount is sufficient to meet the 
forseeable domestic demand of the state (Lawrence 
and Saunders, 1975). Problems arise, however, if 
additional quantities will be demanded for . 
agriculture and energy development. 
The State Engineer has approved filings 
totaling just under 600,000 acre feet from the 
remaining amount of the state's allotment. These 
fllings, if proved, could by themselves exhaust the 
entire entitlement (Hansen, 1975). The majority of 
this remaining water is covered by an approved 
application, in the name of the Bureau of 
Reclamation, for the Central Utah Project. That 
flow which remains is associated with approved 
applications in the lower reaches of the basin and 
along major tributaries of the Colorado River. 
It is obvious, therefore, that Utah is currently 
utilizing or has commitments for using the entire 
1.4 maf to which the state is entitled. 
Indian water rights 
The Supreme Court, in 1908, held that when 
Indian reservations were established, sufficient 
water to supply all Indian lands was also reserved. 
The Wlnten Doctrine interpretation discussed 
below, has made the Indians an important element 
in any plans to develop Utah's remaining water. 
The case of Wlnten VI. United States is 
generally thought to be the real beginning of the 
reservation doctrine, an item which will be 
discussed at greater length later in this section. The 
essential point of the Winters decision is that 
waters set aside as belonging to the Indian 
reservations are superior to other subsequent 
appropriators who obtained their rights under state 
law, even though the Indians had not yet placed 
their waters to a beneficial use (Hansen, 1975). The 
justification for the Winters decision is not clear. 
Some viewpoints, however, reflect the idea that the 
motive behind the action was to provide the Indians 
with the potential of rebuilding their lives after the 
westward migration had . destroyed their previous 
livelihood (Hansen, 1975). 
One major problem with rights as defined 
under the Wlnten Doctrine is quantifying those 
rights. If all the land belonging to the Indians were 
to be assessed as arable, the water requirements 
would more than exhaust the remaining Colorado 
River ~llotment in Utah. Furthermore, negotia-
tions with Indian representatives have seen these 
water demands continually reevaluated upward. 
A second problem area is a legal one; whether 
the Wlnten Doctrine intended the reserved water 
to be utilized for other than agricultural-related 
purposes. There has been no definitive answer to 
the question by the courts as yet and so the issue 
will remain moot until resolved. 
The Indians have been involved in most recent 
water developments in the Colorado River Basin. 
Specifically, they have been guaranteed water in 
the new Central Utah Project (CUP). In 1965, a 
contract was executed between the United States 
(Bureau of Reclamation and Bureau of Indian 
Affairs), the Ute Indian Tribe, and the Central 
Utah Water Conservancy District, in which the 
non-Indian parties recognized 36,450 acres of 
Indian lands as being served or to be served from 
the Duchesne River. For their part, the Indians 
agreed to defer development of 15,242 acres of 
non-irrigated land (USBR, 1973). This particular 
agreement related only to the Bonneville Unit of 
the CUP, however. Similar deferrals should be 
executed for the Upalco and Uintah Units of the 
CUP totaling 13,876 acres. Thus, the Ute Indians 
would defer irrigation to a total of 29,118 acres of 
land (USBR, 1973). 
The key point in these actions is that the water 
use has been deferred, not abandoned. The 
agreement provides that Indian water supplies may 
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be converted to uses other than agricultural, with 
the understanding that the total water to be used by 
the Indians will not exceed the equivalent of 4.0 
acre-feet per acre for the acreage from which the 
water is converted (USBR, 1973). 
Since the execution of these agreements there 
have been considerable delays in the full develop-
ment of the Central Utah Project. Congress has 
failed to appropriate funds and inflation has forced 
alterations in original plans. These delays have led 
to a general dissatisfaction by the Indians with the 
proposed development of their water rights, 
resulting in suits being filed to halt construction of 
the CUP until the Indian rights are guaranteed. 
At the present time 129,201 acres of Ute and 
Ouray Reservation land are claimed and deter-
mined to be arable under the Wlnten Doctrine. If 
a water requirement of 3 acre-feet per acre is 
assumed, the Ute tribe's rights to undeveloped 
Upper Colorado River Basin water would be 
387,000 acre feet per year (Lewis, 1975). Thus, the 
Indians will be a major component in any future 
plans to develop the state's remaining water. 
Salinity 
Salinity problems arise because all water 
developments produce increases in salinity concen-
tration. Public law 92-500 (Federal Pollution Act 
Amendments of 1972) implies that salinity levels 
should be maintained at or below 1972 levels 
(Lawrence and Saunders, 1975). There are 
essentially two ways of preventing salt buildup: 
take out the salt, or restrict further water use. 
Desalinization is costly, and restricting further . 
water use would essentially mean a moratorium on 
any development. Extensive work is being done on 
the salinity problem of the Colorado River. 
Nonetheless, any development on the river cannot 
proceed without consideration of the salt problem. 
Federal water rights-the 
reservation doctrine 
The reservation doctrine is based on the 
premise that since all of the land now occupied by 
the western states once belonged to the federal 
government, the western states did not acquire title 
to the public lands once they were admitted to the 
union. Therefore, the federal government still 
retains ownership of these federally-retained lands. 
These claims extend to the right to dispose of and 
regulate the public lands and waters in accordance 
with the Property Clause of the Constitution 
(Hansen, 1975). 
In answer to those who claim that the federal 
government relinquished control of these water 
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rights with the Act of 1866, 1870, and the Desert 
Land Act of 1877, the federal government claims 
that control was only deferred to the western states, 
but ownership remained in the hands of the federal 
government (Hansen, 1975). Therefore, when the 
government reserved a part of the public domain 
for its own purposes, it also reserved sufficient 
water to facilitate these purposes. 
The beginning of the reservation doctrine is 
generally associated with the Wlnten Doctrine 
mentioned earlier in conjunction with Indian 
rights. However, subsequent cases indicate that the 
reservation doctrine may also apply to other water 
withdrawals. 
The key problem with water rights claimed 
under the reservation doctrine is again one of no 
clearly defined amounts or purposes. The possibil-
ity of conflict between states and the federal 
government is always present since the watershed 
on which most of the streams and rivers originate in 
Utah and the other western states is federal land. 
Efforts have been made in Congress to 
quantify the amount of water which would be 
classified as belonging to the federal government 
under the reservation doctrine. Until such time as 
the law is clarified there will always exist the 
possibility that presently allocated water would be 
subject to potential federal demands. 
Potential water uses agriculture 
The portion of the Upper Colorado River 
Basin located in Utah contains over one million 
acres of arable land. The 1965 Upper Colorado 
Region Framework Study sponsored by the Water 
Resources Council indicated that 307,600 acres 
were under irrigation. Of this portion, 125,000 
acres did not receive full irrigation requirements. 
(A full amount is defined by the ' study as water 
sufficient to satisfy consumptive use as calculated 
by the Blaney-Criddle method.) (Lawrence and 
Saunders, 1975.) 
The majority of the area's agricultural water 
rights are located along the Duchesne River in the 
Uintah Basin. Beef, grade A dairying, and sheep 
are the main enterprises. The principal crops are 
related to the livestock industry, and in order of 
greatest acreage are alfalfa, pasture, barley, corn, 
silage, wheat, and oats. Livestock grazing is 
permitted on National Forest lands and the grazing 
districts of the Bureau of Land Management. The 
growing season is too short for most cash crops and 
precipitation is inadequate for dry farming 
(Skogerboe and Austin, 1967). 
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Until very recently it appeared that agriculture 
would be the only major water user in the Colorado 
River system in Utah. To utilize the state's full 
allotment vast exports of water to the Bonneville 
Basin were contemplated. Potential new water 
uses, especially those related to energy, have 
permanently altered that view. 
It is the view in the State Engineer's office that 
there are only two possibilities open to agriculture, 
since it is the use which will find it most difficult 
competing on the open market for sufficient water. 
First, the possibility exists that increases in 
demand for agricultural products will cause food 
prices to rise giving farmers sufficient incentive and 
purchasing power to compete with other demands 
for water on the open market. Second, a public 
desire to preserve agriculture could prompt action 
by the state legislature, to prevent the transfer of 
water from agriculture to other uses (Hansen, 
1975). Such an action would maintain the 
agricultural base and would essentially prohibit 
agricultural water rights from being allocated in 
the free market. 
At the present time agricultural producers . 
seem to be ambivalent about such an action. Many 
are concerned that water will not continue to be 
available for agricultural production. At the same 
time, however, farmers also see the possibility of 
selling their water rights at a high price to some 
industrial operation and using the income for 
retirement or for investment in some other 
business. Consequently they do not wish to see 
public action which would preclude this possibility. 
Although new inbasin irrigation could con-
ceivably consume vast amounts of water, com-
mitted agricultural water, which in this case means 
the Bonneville, Uintah, Upalco, and Jensen units 
of the Central Utah Project, will provide only about 
108,000 acre feet for agriculture (Lawrence and 
Saunders, 1975). 
Energy 
Energy related water uses are generally 
associated with four principal activities: oil shale, 
thermal-electric power generation, conventional 
coal mining, and coal gasification and liquefaction. 
Because of the nature of the energy shortage and 
the slow development of solar and nuclear power 
plants, the use of coal and other fossil fuels is 
approaching a crash status. In light of this 
situation the coal and oil shale reserves of Eastern 
Utah are of particular importance. 
The water requirements for coal mining are 
small, and often sufficient water is developed in the 
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mine itself to meet mmmg needs. Electric 
generating plants consume about 15,000 acre feet 
of water annually per 1,000 megawatts of capacity. 
The majority of the water is used for cooling 
purposes. At the moment only about 7,800 acre 
feet annually are being used for thermal power 
generation, but at least four large thermal plants 
are in various stages of development. The 
associated water requirements would be about 
120,000 acre feet annually to supply an additional 
8,000 megawatts of capacity (Lawrence and 
Saunders, 1975). 
The water requirements, methods of delivery, 
and uses of water for oil shale will be discussed in 
depth in a later chapter. Basically, the projected 
water needs for a 100,000 blsl day operation and a 
support community of 8,000 people are estimated 
at 36,000 acre feet annually (Lawrence and 
Saunders, 1975). 
Water for coal gasification and liquefaction is 
estimated at 15,000 acre feet per year for a 250 M 
cu ftlday operation (USDI, 1974). At the moment 
the number of plants and their size is speCUlative, 
although the amount of the state's coal deposits 
indicates that the industry will be important to 
Utah's -energy development plans. 
A problem, however, with all such experi-
mental operations is that no large commercial 
plants have been attempted and the water 
estimates may be subject to considerable error. 
WUdUfe and recreadon 
Besides the water demands for agriculture, 
energy, and industry, there is considerable pressure 
to maintain streamflows for fishery, recreational, 
and aesthetic purposes. Some federal legislation 
including the Wilderness Act, Wild Horse and 
Burro Act and recently the Endangered Species 
Act, if interpreted literally, could stop all 
development for any purposes along many energy-
related waterways. Section 7 of the Endangered 
Species Act reads, speaking of federal involvement 
in any way, " ... the actions shall not jeopardize the 
continued existence of such endangered species 
and threatened species or result in the destruction 
or modification of habitat of such species which is 
determined by the Secretary, after consultation as 
appropriate with the affected States, to be critical" 
(Phelps, 1975, p. 76). As an example of the 
potential implications of these environmental 
statutes, Utah's and Colorado's oil shale tracts may 
be inhabited by five endangered species of 
mammals and fish. The federal involvement in the 
management of these tracts in leasing and 
developing them could eliminate any action which 
would alter in any way the natural habitat of these 
species. In effect, the action would eliminate 
development. 
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Environmental agitation for the preservation 
of the natural environment of the Upper Colorado 
River Basin has had considerable impact. Recent 
political developments in the State of Colorado, for 
example, have delayed some energy development 
projects in that state. Finally there are some 
proposals to designate many of the energy-related 
waterways in Utah as wilderness areas. Such action 
would completely eliminate development along 
those rivers. 
Future water polley 
It should be obvious from the preceding pages, 
that the formulation of a state water policy which 
reflects current water needs is of paramount 
importance. Historically, the state, as represented 
by the Board of Water . Resources and the State 
Engineer, has supported and encouraged any water 
development which did not injure other water 
users. The guiding principle was first in filing, first 
in right. This policy, however, has resulted in the 
potential overallocation of virtually all of Utah's 
streams and rivers. The problem is particularly 
acute in the Upper Colorado River Basin. It is-now 
apparent that the problem is no longer one of 
getting the water developed, but of choosing 
between competing and often conflicting uses. 
The administrative problems in dealing with 
the vast number of competing and conflicting water 
filings have resulted in the Governor formally 
declaring a moratorium on all water allocations in 
the state. In reality such a situation has existed for 
some time, especially in regards to the state's ' 
Colorado River water. As an example of the 
magnitude of the problem, energy filings totaling 
1.2 maf are on file for the Upper Colorado River 
Basin alone (Hansen, 1975). This amount is nearly 
equal to the state's entire Colorado River 
allotment. 
The job of developing a comprehensive water 
policy will most likely incorporate two primary 
concepts: attempting to obtain maximum usage of 
presently approved water rights and formulating 'a 
sound criteria for the allocation of presently non-
allocated water. In both cases legislative attempts 
have been made to clarify the problems. It is 
apparent, however, that the courts will eventually 
occupy a major role in delineating specific 
guidelines. 
DUlgence 
It has been previously mentioned that 
approved filings for the Upper Colorado River 
Basin will exhaust the state's entitlement if all 
those filings are fully developed. Delays in the full 
utilization of such approved filings have brought 
up the possibility that sufficient action may never 
be taken to fully develop these rights. 
Historically, extensions of time for full 
development have been granted as a matter of 
course. Delays of 50 years are not uncommon. 
The law states that "reasonable and due diligence" 
will be shown in fully utilizing approved allo-
cations. Obviously, this statement is subject to 
wide interpretation. In the past if marginal effort 
was shown in proving up on a right an extension 
would be granted. The critical water situation, 
however, dictates that such latitude may not be in 
the best interests of current priorities. 
The legislature attempted to come to grips 
with the problem when on May 13, 1975, it passed 
S.B. 290 which amended Section 73-3-12 of the 
Utah Code. The act gives to the State Engineer the 
power to strictly limit extensions of time and 
requires proof as to the necessity of such 
extensions. If proof of "reasonable and due 
diligence" is not shown, the State Engineer, 
following hearings, is empowered to lapse the 
filings, thus returning the water to the state for 
future allocation. 
It is difficult to assess the impact of the statute 
without allowing time for the administrative 
process- to function. Nonetheless, a number of 
filings, by some estimates up to 100,000 acre feet 
will be lapsed. 
Forfeiture 
A second area of concern regarding already 
allocated water is the issue of abandonment and 
forfeiture. In this situation, water which has 
already been allocated and developed is not being 
utilized. The law specifically mentions the time 
necessary to define abandonment and forfeiture. 
Nonetheless, they are primarily judicial decisions 
and technically difficult to define. Often only a 
portion of a water right would be subject to such 
action and this situation complicates the process. 
Such efforts could, however, provide the state with 
some new water to allocate to other potential uses. 
PrIority 
The state has seldom departed from the policy 
of first in filing, first in right, as the guideline for 
allocating water. This process was adequate when 
the majority of filings were for the same purposes, 
namely agriculture. In light of the altered energy 
picture and continued municipal demands, the 
question naturally arises whether the use of the 
filing date as the sole criterion for allocating water 
is in the best interest of the public. 
There are currently on file with the State 
Engineer literally hundreds of filings, the majority 
of which are dated after 1950. These filings are for 
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a number of purposes, including energy-related 
uses. How to deal with these fllings will be a major 
issue in any water policy. 
The situation was highlighted in the last 
. legislative session, when a piece of legislation (S.B. 
291) was introduced. The bill represented a radical 
departure from the traditional allocation practices. 
In essence it would have empowered the State 
Engineer to decide, without respect to filing date, 
which filings are most important to the public 
welfare and, therefore, should be approved. It 
appears that the primary purpose of the bill was to 
legislate a ranking of priorities to guide future 
water allocations. Such a legislative clarification 
would obviously be easier and faster to obtain than 
a judicial decision, although that latter route will 
likely be explored. Although the bill was defeated, 
it underscores the need in the minds of some people 
to view future allocation of water in terms of 
the apparent reality in increased scarcity. 
It appears that the current feeling among the 
governing officials of the Board of Water Resources . 
and the Governor is that water should be 
developed, allocated, and managed by a basin-wide 
entity, similar in scope to a conservancy district. 
Ideally, and particularly in urbanized areas, water 
allocations should be patterned after public 
utilities: anyone can sign up for water delivery, 
water is priced to cover 3U pply cost, and shortages 
are shared equally (Lawrence and Saunders, 1975). 
As a general policy, public entities seldom 
participate in water development projects without 
actually holding title to the water. Since the 
economic feasibility of such large undertakings is a 
function of size, the operations naturally require 
the allocations of significant amounts of water. 
This situation has some interesting ramifications. 
If large amounts of water are allocated to the state 
to develop and distribute to individual users, the 
state will soon occupy the role of water-broker. 
Individual water rights will be difficult to obtain, 
and the traditional role of State Engineer may be 
altered. Obviously then, the state's own water 
filings will be a significant element in defining a 
water policy. 
In those areas where the Board of Water 
Resources is able to obtain rights or already holds 
them, it has been petitioned by other potential 
users to relinquish parts of those rights. In most 
cases the Board will attempt to reach some type of 
arrangement for granting a firm agreement for use 
of the water in place of the actual water right. Such 
might well be the case with energy demands. 
In summary, it appears that definitive action 
must be taken to reconcile the state's present water 
allocations with future water demands. Utah is 
currently utilizing only a part of the state's 
Colorado River allotment, yet on the books is very 
nearly over-allocated. Efforts to eliminate aban-
doned, stale, and inactive water rights could 
provide some additional water to meet foreseeable 
demands. The quantification of Indian and federal 
government rights would also provide a realistic 
yardstick to evaluate the current water resources 
available to the state. These rights should not con-
tinue to be hypothetically dealt with. Lastly, the 
formulation of meaningful criteria to evaluate the 
vast number of unapproved filings would allow the 
state to make progress with that situation. 
OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGY: WATER 
NEEDS AND SOURCES 
The extraction of oil from oil shale is not new. 
The Indians of the Upper Colorado River Basin 
often amazed settlers by showing them examples of 
the area's burning rocks. In more contemporary 
times, the extraction of a liquid fuel from shale has 
been attempted in various ways. None of these 
previous attempts, however, has approached the 
magnitude now being contemplated for the oil 
shale industry in Utah and Colorado. 
Utah's oil shale deposits are located in the 
Uintah Basin and those deposits with the greatest 
percentage of oil per ton of shale are in eastern 
Utah near the Colorado state line. Some estimates 
indicate that 300 billion barrels of oil are contained 
in these shale reserves (Utah Division of Water 
Resources, 1975). 
The lands which contain oil shale deposits are 
owned by the federal government, by the State of 
Utah, and by private individuals and corporations, 
and comprise thousands of acres. Ten years ago the 
State of Utah filed an application to the Bureau of 
Land Management for In Lieu Selection Rights on 
156,000 acres of federal land. It is expected that 
title to these lands will pass to the state thereby 
placing ownership of a substantial amount of these 
oil shale lands under Utah's ownership. 
In an effort to determine the feasibility of 
shale oil as an alternative to liquid petroleum, the 
Department of the Interior, in 1974, invited bids 
and awarded leases for prototype oil shale 
development on tracts which are known as U a and 
Ub, located adjacent to the White River. Under the 
agreements of the lease the consortium of Phillips 
Petroleum Company, Sun Oil Company, and Sohio 
Petroleum Corporation, is required to make bonus 
payments over a five-year period to the Department 
of the Interior totaling $120,704,000 (Utah 
Division of Water Resources, 1975). 
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Because of the high costs involved in the 
development of these prototype tracts, no single 
company seemingly has the resources to finance the 
operation independently. Rather, the approach has 
been to form consortia composed of a number of 
firms, generally major oil firms, to provide the 
development expertise and necessary capital and 
technology. As an example of the tremendous costs 
involved, one company has estimated that 
$200,000,000 will have to be spent before the first 
drop of shale oil is produced in Utah (Utah 
Division of Water Resources, 1975). 
The following pages present a brief description 
of these consortia, the technology that will most 
likely be utilized in mining and retorting oil shale, 
some of the associated water requirements, 
possibilities for obtaining this water, and some of 
the problems that are to be expected. 
The development flmu-Colony 
Development Operation 
Colony Development Operation, a joint 
venture of Atlantic Richfield Company, Shell Oil 
Company, Ashland Oil Inc., and Oil Shale Corp. , 
has operated a pilot plant to recover oil from shale 
since 1971 in Colorado. It was thought that the 
Colony group would be the first group to operate a 
commercial plant. Their timetable had called for 
commercial operation to begin near Rifle, 
Colorado, by 1978. The rising cost of oil shale 
prod uction coupled with an altered political 
climate in Colorado which is oriented toward 
environmental demands, however, forced the 
Colony organization to indefinitely suspend its 
project last year. 
At the heart of the Colony operation is the 
retorting method developed by the organization 
known as Tosco II. Research on the Tosco II 
method was conducted at the Denver Research 
Institute for 10 years (1956-66) and under Colony 
sponsorship a 24 toni day pilot plant in Colorado 
has been utilized. 
The Tosco process involves the feeding of 
minus 1/2 inch crushed shale particles into a 
horizontal rotating retort, where it is heated by 
mixing with small hot ceramic balls. Shale oil 
vapors are distilled off, removed, and condensed. 
The cooled balls and spent shale are discharged 
from the retort and screened to separate out the 
balls, which are sent to a heater, reheated, and 
recycled to the retort. The spent shale is cooled and 
discharged to compacted waste piles. It normally 
contains about 4 percent of carbonaceous "semi-
coke" coating on the particles of spent shale, as 
discharged. 
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Paraho Development Corporation- White 
River Shale on Corporation 
Sohio Petroleum Company, heads a 17 
company consortium known as Paraho Develop-
ment Corporation, the parent company of Paraho 
Oil Shale Demonstration, Inc., the operating 
entity. This group has also operated a small pilot 
plant at government facilities near Rifle, Colorado. 
White River Shale Oil Corporation was 
formed by three of the sponsoring members of 
Paraho to develop the lease tracts in Utah. The 
subsidiary company is currently gathering environ-
mental data in Utah and making plans for 
development. 
The Paraho operation receives its name from 
the retorting method employed by the consortium. 
The Paraho process was originally developed by 
John B. Jones, Jr., who was one of the engineers 
involved in the original Bureau of Mines pilot 
project at Anvil Points, Colorado, from 1945-SS. 
After the project shut down, Jones continued his 
work and development of the process in Brazil. 
In "the Paraho process the material comes out 
about the same size and shape as it goes in, lumps 
which are up to 3 inches in diameter. It is 
compacted in a stable land fill that can be covered 
with the fine gravel not suitable for retort fuel. 
The basic unit of the process is the kiln or 
retort into which the shale is fed. A gas-air mixture 
heats the shale, driving off the vapors which are 
collected in the oil recovery unit. Carbon and low 
BTU gas in the shale help fuel the process. This low 
BTU gas can supply all the energy needs of the 
process including generation of electricity. Another 
by-product of the operation is anhydrous ammonia, 
which has value as a fertilizer. 
Although the two retorting methods have been 
developed independently, some experts feel that a 
combination of the Tosco II and Paraho processes 
will yield the best results. The Tosco method has 
the capability of utilizing small pieces of shale 
which the Paraho method does not. The fine grains 
of shale tend to clog the Paraho kiln. The Paraho 
method, on the other hand, eliminates the need to 
crush the larger chunks into small pieces required 
in the Tosco operation. 
In light of recent progress with the Paraho 
process and the suspension of the Tosco/Colony· 
operation, the Paraho process will probably be the 
one employed for the first prototype plants in 
Colorado and Utah. 
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MinIng 
Except for some very recent developments in 
in situ oil shale production, conventional room and 
pillar mining is the method which is being 
contemplated by most involved in the oil shale 
planning. Open pit and strip mining may have 
some economic advantages but invoke loud 
environmental opposition to an industry already 
sensitive to environmental issues. In addition, most 
of the rich deposits lie beneath a heavy overburden 
and are thus inaccessible from the surface. 
Water requirements and sources 
The experimental nature of any oil shale 
venture means that much of the information 
regarding cost, environmental impact and other 
variables is subject to great speculation. The water 
requirements for the industry fall into this same 
cate~ory. 
. ·T6"e lastest estimates indicate that a daily 
production of 100,000 barrels/day from Utah's 
lease tracts will require at least 26,000 acre feet per 
year. These same estimates, however, indicate that 
it may be theoretically possible to lower the water 
input to a minimum figure of 13,000 acre feet per 
year. The additional water required by the higher 
estimate is related to cooling and dust control 
needs. An additional 4,000 acre feet are expected 
to be needed to supply water for the proposed 
on-site community, if one is built. The Division of 
Water Resources of the State of Utah (197S) has 
indicated that eventually 7S,OOO to 100,000 acre 
feet of water may be needed to support the oil shale 
industry if all leased lands go into production. 
It is difficult to obtain precise information 
about the water requirements for the individual 
phases of the oil shale extraction and production 
processes. Many of the technological advances are 
closely guarded secrets; the details have not been 
disclosed by the development firms. The experi-
mental nature of the industry also makes it difficult 
to obtain accurate estimates. 
Bingham Engineering, of Bountiful, Utah, the 
engineering firm commissioned by the State of 
Utah to investigate the possibility of the White 
River Dam, has released the following water 
estimates for the prototype oil shale plant: 
Water Requirements 
for Oil Shale Lease Tracts Ua and Ub 
Minimum Requirement 
Process plant 9,700 a.f. 
Processed shale dust control, 
irrigation and other 
undefined uses. . . . . . . . . . . .. 1,600 a.f. 
Seepage, evaporation and minor 
losses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1,700 a.f. 
Total Practical Minimum 
Requirement ............... 13,000 a.f. 
Maximum Requirement 
Minimum requirement .......... 13,000 a.f. 
Add: Raw water to 100% water 
cooled process and utility 
plants ................... 8,750 a.f. 
Add: Raw water to augment cooling 
and dust control needs 
required by different retort 
processes ................ 4,500 a.f. 
Total Probable Maximum 
Requirement. .............. 26,250 a.f. 
(Bingham Engineering, 1976) 
The most likely source of water for the oil 
shale lands in Utah appears to be the White River, 
which heads in western Colorado above Meeker 
and is a tributary to the Green River. The 
confluence with the Green is near Ouray, Utah, 
about 26 miles south of Vernal. The average 
annual flow of the White River at the Utah/ 
Colorado line is about 500,000 acre feet. Currently 
the use of the White River is minimal. Colorado 
uses about 40,000 acre feet for irrigation along the 
river, and Utah uses a very small amount for lands 
owned by the Ute Indian Tribe (Utah Division of 
Water Resources, 1975). 
Because the river crosses state boundaries, the 
potential for conflict exists. The Upper Basin 
Compact limits uses of the waters in the Colorado 
River system to a percentage basis, as discussed in 
the last section, but does not specify from which 
rivers or streams that percentage must be taken. 
The White River's location is such that it may play 
an important role in both Utah and Colorado 
energy development. Obviously some type of 
compact defining each state's rights to the river 
would be desirable from a security standpoint. 
Efforts have been made to obtain such an 
agreement but results have not been forthcoming 
and it is thought that such an arrangement might 
take years to finalize. At the moment all parties are 
proceeding with development plans on a unilateral 
ba·sis. 
It should be pointed out, however, that 
Colorado will probably not be able to use a great 
amount of White River water and still meet its 
downstream flow commitments to the lower basin. 
Colorado is currently utilizing most of its Colorado 
River allotment and any new use of the White River 
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would have to be coupled with discontinued use of 
other water. Thus, current water uses in that state 
seem to restrict use of the White River. 
In Utah a number of filings have been made 
for use of the White River. At the moment none of 
these filings has been approved. The most 
important appears to be a 1965 application in the 
name of the Utah Water and Power Board for 
250,000 acre feet. Sohio Petroleum Company has 
also filed for 36,500 acre feet in a 1972 application. 
Although the State Engineer has not yet acted 
upon these and other filings such action must be 
taken before oil shale will be developed. Although 
the State Water Board has a priority of seven years 
over subsequent applications, it appears doubtful 
that the entire 250,000 acre feet application will be 
approved. Rather, some accommodation with other 
energy demands will have to be reached. For 
example, Sohio has petitioned the Utah Board of 
Water Resources for an assignment of a portion of 
the Water and Power Board's application. If the 
necessary water, some 36,000 acre feet, could be 
segregated for use on the 7,592 acres of leased oil 
shale land, Sohio would withdraw its application. 
Inasmuch as the Division of State Lands has an 
enormous potential royalty from the oil shale lands, 
and in view of the Indian lands situated on the 
White River, extensive efforts have been made to 
utilize the White River so as to satisfy both energy, 
agricultural, and Indian rights and needs. 
Proposed water development plans 
The most likely alternative for providing water 
for oil shale development at the prototype tracts in 
Utah is the construction of a dam on the White 
River near Watson. Industry officials view the 
construction of a dam as essential because it 
eliminates uncertainty about an adequate water 
supply. It is argued that such a storage project 
would be necessary regardless of where the water 
rights should come from, be it from presently 
unused White River water, agricultural water, or 
Indian water rights. 
The dam and the reservoir are viewed as a 
multi-purpose operation. Not only would wat~r be 
supplied for the oil shale tracts, but the dam would 
provide flood protection, silt retention, and 
recreational uses. Most important, the project 
would provide storage for irrigation water to be 
used on 13,000 acres of Indian lands. The Indian 
involvement in the project is essential since under 
the Winter'. Doctrine water must be made 
available to all potentially irrigable acreage. Thus, 
the Indian Tribe could lay claim to much of the 
water of the White River without regard to other 
water uses. 
Although the White River Dam appears to be 
the most logical and likely alternative for obtaining 
water for oil shale, the project would, nonetheless, 
be an expensive undertaking. Originally construc-
tion costs were estimated at $7,000,000, but have 
now escalated to $8,500,000. (Personal communi-
cation with Jay R. Bingham, Bingham Engineering 
and Daniel F. Lawrence, Director, Utah Division 
of Water Resources.) It is obvious that the financial 
arrangements for the project are a major obstacle 
in the construction of the dam . 
Several financing alternatives have been 
proposed. One possibility is to have construction 
of the project handled under auspices of the Uintah 
Basin Conservancy District and the Central Utah 
Conservancy District, with the cooperation of the 
Ute and Ouray Indian Tribe. Ownership would 
remain with the state and oil shale, as well as other 
users, would purchase the water as it is utilized. 
The exact contractual arrangements for 
financing the project and delivering the water have 
not yet been made public, but officials have 
indicated that some form of public financing is 
likely. Rather than create a new organization 
entity, financing would likely be carried out under 
the Uintah Conservancy District since it involves 
working with only one county. Funds would be 
obtained in the form of revenue bonds with the 
conservancy district floating the bonds to obtain 
better interest rates. The exact price of water for oil 
shale has not been decided, but discussions with 
state and construction officials indicate that the 
figure will likely fall between $25 and $35 per acre 
foot. 
Another possibility would be to have the oil 
shale consortium itself build the dam. Under the 
terms of the lease agreements with the federal 
government on the prototype tracts, the consortium 
is entitled to investment credits in the fourth and 
fifth years. Thus, it may elect to build the dam 
itself and write the expenses off to these investment 
credits. 
Both of these previously mentioned possibili-
ties incorporate the idea of a significant involve-
ment by the oil shale industry in the construction of 
the White River Dam. Indeed, the project's initial 
focus was to provide water for oil shale. However, 
because of the project's potential benefits for 
groups other than those in oil shale, especially the 
Ute and Ouray Indian Tribe, state officials indicate 
a willingness to examine the feasibility of 
constructing the White River Dam without oil 
shale's participation. In an interview with Daniel 
F. Lawrence, Chairman of the Utah Division of 
Water Resources, he indicated that if the future of 
oil shale were to grow more uncertain the 
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possibility exists that the State of Utah might be 
asked to appropriate the money for the construc-
tion of the dam. Mr. Lawrence in essence stated 
that the White River Dam should be examined on 
its own merits without regard to the future of oil 
shale. 
Efforts to build the White River Dam without 
the oil shale industry's participation appear 
primarily geared toward satisfying the Indian 
water needs. Indeed, regardless of whatever means 
of financing the project is decided upon, the Indian 
water rights will likely be heavily subsidized either 
by oil shale or the state. The reasons for this action 
are essentially political. The Ute and Ouray water 
rights on the White River are not part of the 
deferred water rights under which the Central 
Utah Project operates. Nonetheless, they are water 
rights which the Indian Tribe is entitled to develop. 
Efforts to satisfy these rights could have a positive 
effect on Indian participation with regard to the 
remaining units of the Central Utah Project as well 
as other water developments in Eastern Utah. It, 
therefore, appears likely that about half of the 
storage in the White River dam reservoir will be 
Indian water. Various proposals would give the 
Indians a third to a half equity in the reservoir. Mr. 
Lawrence indicated that the possibility of obtaining 
funding from the Four Corners Regional Council as 
well as other sources for the funding of the Indian 
involvement is being investigated. Nonetheless, 
much of the impact of the White River Dam will be 
to satisfy Indian demands to insure Indian 
participation in other water development projects 
(personal communication with Daniel F. Lawrence, 
Director, Utah Division of Water Resources). 
In summary, no concrete proposals for the 
development of the White River Dam have been 
finalized as yet. Efforts are currently under way to 
complete a memorandum of understanding be-
tween all the interested parties as well as a 
commitment from the state, the conservancy 
districts and the Indians to aid in the financing of 
the preliminary studies to be done on the project. 
The role of oil shale is still cloudy, and 
negotiations are currently under way by the 
companies to obtain extensions of time with regard 
to the investment schedule on which they must 
prove up on their leases. Tosco and Moon Lake 
Electric, an electric-power company with interests 
in developing the area's coal deposits, have also 
petitioned to be involved in the White River Dam 
project. Their water needs must also be evaluated 
with regard to the water capacity of the project. It 
also appears likely that the State Engineer's office 
will approve the petition to segregate a quantity of 
the Utah Power Board's filing for development on 
the White River. The original request was for the 
,ii, 
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segregation of 36,000 acre feet. However, it is likely 
that some 53,000 acre feet will be segregated for 
energy-related development. 
According to Jay R. Bingham Engineering, 
the firm contracted by the State Board of Water 
Resources to survey the possibilities of the dam, 
work is currently being completed on the 
environmental impact study and test drilling for 
the foundation is 50 percent completed. 
Bingham also indicates that the dam may have 
to be one of the first items built for the proposed oil 
shale complex. Blowers necessary for the retort 
have to be transported to the site. The most 
economical method is to transport these blowers 
intact. Since the weight of the blowers, approxi-
mately 700 tons, exceeds the capacity of all existing 
bridges in the White River area, the dam would 
have to be constructed first to provide a means of 
transporting the heavy equipment. Because of this 
situation and if all other aspects of the planning go 
as scheduled, the engineering firm estimates that 
the construction on the dam could begin within a 
year and a half to two years. 
The construction of the proposed White River 
Dam is symbolic of the major obstacle for a 
commercial oil shale plant; astronomical costs. It is 
estimated that the dam alone would cost 
$8,500,000 and that the total costs for the entire 
commercial module could approach $1.5 billion. 
These costs must also be viewed in light of other 
financial obligations besetting members of the 
White River consortium. Sohio Petroleum, for 
example, has an obligation ofS1 billion for its share 
of the Alaska pipeline. It comes as no surprise then 
that the White River Oil Shale Corporation is 
attempting to shift some of this financial burden to 
other investors. . 
The economic feasibility of such mammoth 
projects is closely tied to the market price for crude 
oil. Exact figures are not available as to what oil 
price would make oil shale feasible, but it is safe to 
assume that the price is higher than the current 
free market figure for crude. 
The availability of funds and the sharply rising 
costs of construction and equipment are also 
clouding oil shale's future. To offset this problem 
of lack of adequate venture capital, some groups 
such as Colony Development, have attempted to 
obtain long-term, low interest federal loans for 
their projects. They've also attempted to receive 
some form of guaranteed price support for 
petroleum to insure an adequate return from an oil 
shale operation. To date all such efforts have 
proven unsuccessful but are no doubt continuing . 
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Officials once felt that work on the commer-
cial plant may begin by 1977 and that by 1980 three 
commercial units, two in Colorado and one in 
Utah, could be in operation. However, the time 
schedule for the entire project is currently under an 
indefinite holding pattern. Whether it will even be 
attempted is the subject of great speculation. If a 
prototype plant is 'completed, there are no present 
plans to extend capacity beyond a 100,000 
barrell day limit. 
POPULATION IMPACTS 
The information in the last section on water 
for oil shale indicates that the proposed White 
River Dam could provide water for the prototype 
operation without infringing upon existing agricul-
tural water supplies. Domestic water supplies for 
the increased popUlation associated with oil shale 
growth may present some problems, however. 
Although present plans indicate that some 4,000 
additional acre feet will be requested to supply 
municipal water, there are no guarantees that all or 
any of the oil shale popUlation will locate on-site. If 
a new town is not built existing communities will 
have to absorb the popUlation growth. In that case, 
will the communities be able to supply domestic 
water without affecting the agricultural sector? 
It is the purpose of this section to examine the 
population growth associated with the proposed oil 
shale plant and the necessary water needed to 
supply this population increase. 
It is important to distinguish between water 
"demand" and "requirement." The term "require-
ment" implies a fixed need for water where the 
quantity utilized is quite independent of the price 
of water. Need is related to water-using technology, 
to crop requirements in irrigation, or to the 
popUlation using water. Demand, on the other 
hand, is a specialized term utilized by economists 
to express the relationship between quantity of 
water used at various relative prices of water. One 
measure of the degree of responsiveness of the 
quantity demanded to changes in the relative price 
of water is known as elasticity of demand. 
It is generally assumed that the demand for 
domestic water is relatively inelastic; i.e., that there 
is little alteration in water consumption as a result 
of price changes. Empirical studies have indicated, 
however, that the household demand for water is 
indeed affected by price changes as well as other 
factors. For example, Gardner and Schick (1964) 
found the elasticity of demand for household water 
to be -.77. People in communities with high prices 
consumed less water per capita than people in 
communities with low prices. As among 44 
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northern Utah communities an increase in the 
price of water of 10 percent was associated with a 
per capita decrease in the quantity consumed of 7.7 
percent. It was also discovered that uses such as 
lawn and garden watering were particularly 
responsive to rate changes. When municipal prices 
are high, development of other water supply 
sources becomes economically attractive, and 
people find various ways to conserve water. 
This response of consumption to price may be 
important in establishing water use figures for such 
communities as Vernal, Utah, where water has 
generally been plentiful and cheap. Consumption 
figures indicate that water use for domestic 
purposes has been relatively high when compared 
with national household consumption estimates. 
Increases in the rates charged for water demanded 
by municipal consumers may make more water 
available for other uses. 
The population increase connected with all 
aspects of Utah's energy resources has been an area 
which has attracted great public interest. Every 
community located near untapped energy resources 
anticipates the economic benefits associated with 
such development. The majority of these communi-
ties also seem to be anticipating some of the 
problems associated with this growth. 
Since the plant capacity estimated for the 
prototype operation has continually fluctuated, it 
has been difficult to establish what the exact 
population increases will be. As recently as 
November, 1974, in their task force report for 
Project Independence prepared for the Federal 
Energy Administration, the Department of the 
Interior estimated that a 100,000 barrel/day 
prototype operation would involve a total oil shale 
population of 24,400 people by 1980. This same 
study also estimated that accelerated development 
would involve over 90,000 people by the year 2000 
(USDI, 1974). Of course, these figures reflect the 
belief that future oil shale development would far 
surpass the prototype capacity of 100,000 barrels/ 
day at some later date. 
Projecting the population distribution for the 
oil shale population is also a difficult task. It was 
originally thought that a majority of the population 
would locate in the Ashley V alley-Vernal area with 
the rest being disbursed throughout the Uintah 
Basin. Subsequent studies, however, have indi-
cated that Rangely, Colorado, located only 30 miles 
from the proposed site, would absorb a large share. 
The possibility of a new town being con-
structed near the present town of Bonanza, Utah, 
would eliminate the need for the oil shale popula-
tion to locate in existing communities. If such a 
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new town is constructed, it would have to include 
all the necessary facilities to attract the oil shale 
work force. 
In light of the current status of oil shale 
development in Utah, namely no immediate plans 
for expansion beyond a 100,000 barrell day 
capacity, population estimates have peen scaled 
down. In a 1975 publication, Lewis (1975) 
estimates that the total population increases 
associated with oil shale development for the Utah 
lease tracts will not exceed 13,780, with a final 
commercial operational estimate of 12,535. If 
plans for the unit begin in 1978, the increased 
population will not become a factor until the fifth 
year of 1983. The eighth year represents the high 
point in population increase. 
The population figures presented by Lewis 
indicate that the majority of the anticipated 
population, assuming no new town is built, will 
locate in the Vernal, Utah, and Rangely, Colorado, 
areas. Duchesne and Roosevelt, located in 
Duchesne County, Utah, would also receive an 
increase in population, however. 
The figures indicate that Vernal would 
anticipate a final population increase of 3,958, 
Rangley an increase of 5,396, and Roosevelt and 
Duchesne increases of 1,574 and 479 respectively. 
Even if the new town is not built there will still be a 
considerable on-site population. It is estimated 
that 30 percent of the construction force and 10 
percent of the operations force would live at or near 
the construction site (Lewis, 1975). 
If the new town is built, it will capture the 
majority of oil shale population. Lewis (1975) 
estimates that the town would have a final 
population of 10,028 with an eighth year high of 
11,024. Approximately 80 percent of the oil shale 
population would locate in the new facility. The 
remaining people would locate throughout the 
Uintah Basin. Vernal and Rangely would capture 
the great majority of this non-new town population. 
Roosevelt and Duchesne's population increase 
would be negligible. 
Water needs 
The Board of Water Resources has stated that 
4,000 acre feet will be petitioned by the White 
River Oil Shale Corporation to supply adequate 
municipal water. This amount would be in addition 
to 26,000 acre feet requested for industrial 
requirements. If a consumption rate of .25 acre feet 
per capita is used (this represents a rate of 225 
gallons per capita per day and is the rate generally 
used by the Project Independence Task Force 
Report) there would be enough water to support a. 
population of 16,000 people on-site. This is more 
than is projected in the Lewis population estimates. 
Using these same water consumption esti-
mates and population figures for the population 
distribution without the new town, the water 
"requirements" for the Vernal area can be 
indicated. (See Table 3.) The Vernal figures are the 
only ones shown since that is the only Utah area 
with a considerable projected population increase. 
The same procedure would hold true for the other 
areas, however. The population table indicates that 
there will be a population increase of 4,010 in the 
eighth year of development. Using the .25 acre foot 
per capita consumption estimate the water 
requirement for that population increase is 
approximately 1,000 acre-feet of water. 
One of the primary concerns of rural 
communities located within the oil shale area is 
that this additional water will be taken from 
existing agricultural supplies. Although it will be 
shown later in this report that there are a number 
of potential sources of domestic water, for the sake 
of argument, let it be assumed that all the 
additional water would be withdrawn from 
agriculture. How much agricultural land would be 
affected? 
Using an annual irrigation diversion figure of 
3.0 acre feet/acre, in the eighth year, which is the 
high popUlation year, only approximately 335 
acres would need to be removed from irrigation to 
supply the needed increase in domestic water 
needs. Thus, it would appear to require the 
sacrifice of very little agricultural acreage to supply 
the water for a significant population increase. 
This statement ignores the fact that water quality 
needs for domestic uses may not be satisfied 
through the simple transfer of irrigation water to 
municipal uses. Obviously some treatment of the 
water would be required or an exchange arrange-
ment reached where communities could substitute 
the irrigation water for high quality water. Again, 
it should be mentioned that this transfer situation 
is hypothetical and there are still other ways to 
obtain sufficient water without substantial direct 
withdrawal from agricultural sources. These other 
alternatives for the Vernal area will be discussed in 
the next section. 
The newtown 
Obviously, if a new town is built, a great deal 
of the concern currently felt by existing communi-
ties aJJOut absorbing the oil shale population will be 
alleviated. Whether the new town will in fact be 
built is uncertain at present. Vernal and Rangely 
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are located less than 40 miles from the proposed oil 
shale site, and highway improvements could 
shorten that distance, both in miles and in trip 
time. Even if the new town is built, however, there 
will still be a close association between the new 
town and these two communities. A second 
consideration is that the new town may not be of 
permanent duration. It may exist only for the oil 
shale ind ustry and once the shale is fully exploited 
the need for the town may dis.appear. Since the 
shale deposits are so extensive, however, the town 
may last for a very long time. Whether the high cost 
of the construction of the new town would offset 
transportation costs to and from Vernal and 
Rangely is debatable. Much depends on how long 
the new town can be assumed to last and over what 
period the capital co~ts can be amortized. One 
thing is fairly obvious; Ua and Ub are located in a 
desolate desert without the natural geo-physical 
features that would make a new town an attractive 
place to live. There would have to be some real 
incentive to make people want to locate there. 
Water sources for Duchesne 
and Roosevelt 
The information presented in the Lewis' 
population estimates indicates that Vernal, Utah, 
will capture the bulk of the oil shale popUlation to 
locate in Utah. These same figures also indicate 
that Roosevelt and Duchesne will receive a 
relatively small popUlation increase. The following 
section will examine in depth the sources and water 
needs for the Vernal, Ashley Valley area. The water 
sources for Roosevelt and Duchesne will be briefly 
outlined here. 
Roosevelt, the larger of the two Duchesne 
County communities, obtains its domestic water 
from the following sources: 
1. Uriah Heaps Spring-piped from the 
spring near Whiterocks. The spring is 
Indian owned and has a capacity of 1,000 
gallons per minute. (1614 acre feet/year). 
The spring was the sole source for 
Roosevelt culinary water until October 
1975. 
i Hancock Cove Well--developed and 
started to use in October 1975. Capacity 
is placed at 1.2 cfs (864 acre feet/year). 
3. Campbell Well-the rights have been 
cleared and development is anticipated by 
1976. Preliminary estimates of capacity 
indicate a rate of 4.5 cfs - (3240 acre feet/ 
year). 
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The system now has two 500,000 gallon 
storage tanks and will add a one million gallon 
tank with the Campbell Well. Extensive remodel-
ing and replacement of old lines has taken place 
throughout the system resulting in a savings of 
about one-third in water used. It is estimated that 
the two wells will double the supply and that 
present commitments will be adequate for a 
population of 10,000 unless considerable water-
using industrial development takes place. That 
prospect appears unlikely at present. Should 
additional needs arise they will most likely be met 
by additional wells. (Personal communication with 
Larry Bagley, Roosevelt City Manager, and Leon 
C. Michaelson, area coordinator, Cooperative 
Extension Service, Utah State University.) 
In 1960, Duchesne City began a major water 
system improvement program. The program 
included the development of new wells, the 
construction of a desander / chlorinator facility, 
new transmission and supply lines, a reinforced 
concrete reservoir and an entirely new distribution 
system. In 1971, a new pump house, a steel storage 
tank, and a high-level distribution system were 
constructed to bring water from the lower 
elevations of Duchesne to the "Blue Bench" area. 
The primary source of water for the commun-
ity is six shallow wells located in the Murray 
Springs area three and a half miles north of town. 
Two additional wells have been recently completed 
in the area. It is estimated that all eight wells 
pumping simultaneously will produce 1,000 gals/ 
minute, or 2.23 cubic feet per second (1614 acre 
feetl year) . 
Other potential sources of water are two 
springs on Rock Creek located 25 miles northwest 
of the town, Starvation Reservoir, located three 
miles from town, and the Duchesne River which 
passes through Duchesne City. In 1905, the federal 
government filed an application to appropriate 15 
cfs from the Duchesne River for municipal 
purposes. There is some controversy over the 
application, however; the State Engineer's office 
maintains that the water rights in question are 
owned by the U. S. Bureau of Indian Affairs. Legal 
action is pending to establish ownership of the 
water (Valley Engineering, 1975). 
Legal action to establish title to the disputed 
right on the Duchesne River appears imperative 
for the community to develop an adequate future 
water supply. The eight wells in the Murray 
Springs area are sufficient to satisfy a population of 
3,300 people at present consumption levels (Valley 
Engineering, 1975). Improvements in storage 
facilities would also eliminate existing storage 
deficiencies. 
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In short, current water supplies appear 
adequate to satisfy the need$ of the projected 
population increase if rights to the Duchesne River 
are clarified. Without that, efforts would have to be 
made to obtain water from Starvation Reservoir or 
other sources which might have an effect on 
agriculture if the community were to undergo 
substantial popUlation increase. The population 
figures in this study, however, assume the increase 
from oil shale to be rather small. 
Upalco and Uintah Units of the 
Central Utah Project 
These two units of the Central Utah Project, if 
completed, would provide more than enough water 
to satisfy any substantial population increase. The 
Uintah Unit would provide 52,000 acre feet of 
municipal, industrial, and agricultural water to the 
Roosevelt area. The project also includes water for 
42,000 acres of Indian land. The Upalco unit 
would be located near the center of Duchesne 
County and would provide 20,500 acre feet of new 
water for municipal, industrial, and agricultural 
purposes (Central Utah Water Conservancy Dis-
trict, 1975). 
The future of the two units is far from certain, 
however. Both projects appear to have a low 
priority . behind already promised but as yet 
uncomplt!ted water projects. In their favor is the 
importance of satisfying Indian rights. It was 
mentioned in an earlier section that the Indian 
demands must be satisfied or further construction 
on the Central Utah Project faces the possibility of 
indefmite suspension. The development of the 
Upalco and Uintah Units, therefore, may be 
determined by what pressures can be brought to 
bear by the Indians and industry. 
Water sources for the Vernal-Ashley 
VaIleyarea 
The information presented in the last section 
indicates that Vernal-Ashley Valley will be the area 
of the State of Utah to realize the greatest direct 
impacts from the prototype oil shale operation. 
Even if all the needed water for the popUlation 
increase associated with a 100,000 barrel/day 
prototype plant were to come from agricultural 
supplies it would only involve an amount sufficient 
to irrigate some 300 acres. Nonetheless, if energy 
development in the area were to be undertaken on a 
large scale, that situation could easily change. 
The purpose of this section of the report is to 
investigate the current water usage in the Vemal-
Ashley Valley area and to examine alternative 
plans for obtaining water for agriculture and 
municipal and industrial uses. 
Current water sources 
There are two public water systems that 
currently operate within the boundaries of the 
Ashley Valley. These are the Maeser and Ashley 
Valley-Vernal systems. The supply source for both 
systems is the Ashley Springs, located adjacent to 
Ashley Creek nine miles north of Vernal. 
From the Spring Box and the adjacent 
sedimentation and chlorination works, the water 
flows southward into Ashley Valley. Water lines 
have been laid adjacent to the roads along section 
boundaries. This system provides water service to 
most of the developed areas in the upper Ashley 
Valley. In the cities, the Vernal and Maeser water 
systems provide water service to all developed areas 
Table 1. Gravity model distribution of population Impact among principal urban places In the Ulntah 
Basin auumlng no new town Is constructed (Lewis, 1975). 
Cumulative 
total population At or Other parts of 
Year impact Duchesnea Roosevelta Vern ala Rangelya near site Uintah Basinc 
Commercial Stage 
Phase I 
5 4,538 152 500 1,257 1,713 688 227 
6 6,218 206 678 1,704 2,324 994 311 
7 8,277 277 911 2,290 3,121 1,265 414 
8 13,780 485 1,595 4,010 5,466 1,536 689 
9 11,310 419 1,376 3,461 4,718 770 566 
10 10,902 412 1,354 3,405 4,614 545 545 
Commercial Stage 
Phase II 
11-15 12,535 479 1,574 3,958 5,396 501 627 
16-20 12,535 479 1,574 3.958 5,396 501 627 
aGravity proportions for distribution of urban population 
Duchesne 0.042 
Roosevelt 0.138 
Vernal 0.347 
Rangely 0.4 73 
bBasic assumption for on-site population projections: 
1. 30.0 percent of the construction force would live in the construction camp at or near the site. 
2. 10.0 percent of the operations force would live at or near the site. 
Cpive percent of total population impact is allocated to non-urban parts of the Uintah Basin. 
Table 2. Gravity model distribution population Impact with new town (Lewis, 1975). 
PopulatiQn New 
Duchesneb Rooseveltb Vernalb 
Other parts of 
Year impact towna Rangelyb Uintah Basinc 
Commercial Stage 
Phase I 
5 4,538 3,630 36 119 299 408 45 
6 6,218 4,974 50 163 410 559 62 
7 8,277 6,622 66 217 546 744 83 
8 13,780 11,024 110 361 909 1,238 138 
9 11,310 9,048 90 297 746 1,016 113 
10 10,902 8,722 87 286 719 980 109 
Commercial Stage 
Phase II 
11-15 12,535 10,028 100 329 826 1,127 125 
16-20 12,535 10,028 100 329 826 1,127 125 
aBased on an 80.0 percent capture rate for the new town. 
bGravity proportions for distribution of urban population outside "new town:" 
Duchesne 0.042 
Roosevelt 0.138 
Rangely 0.473 
cPive percent of population impact outside new town is allocated to non-urban parts of the Uintah Basin. 
(fhe sum of individual population impacts may not equal total impact (column 2) due to rounding.} 
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within the respective communities. These two 
systems are an integral part of the Ashley Valley 
. system. 
At the time the larger Ashley Valley system 
was developed in 1961, most of the then existing 
lines, including those in Maeser and Vernal, were 
incorporated into the system. Under terms of the 
agreement, Maeser Improvement District obtained 
a one-eighth interest in the supply aqueduct, 
headworks, and treatment facilities. The district is 
still responsible fgr maintaining and administering 
that part of the distribution system within its 
boundaries. The remainder of the Ashley Valley 
Water System is owned and maintained by Vernal 
City. 
Table 3. Water needed to support on shale popu-
lation and potential agricultural acreage 
affected bt the Vernal area 8IIuming no 
new town Is conltructed. 
Population Watera 
Year impact needed 
Commercial Stage 
Phase I 
5 1,257 314.25 
6 1,704 426.0 
7 2,290 572.50 
8 4,010 1002.5 
9 3,461 865.25 
10 3,405 851.25 
Chm~ercial Stage 
Phase II 
11-15 3,958 989.50 
16-20 3.958 989.50 
aBased on estimate of .25 acre feet per capita. 
bBased upon estimate of 3.0 acre feet per acre. 
Acreageb 
affected 
104.75 
142.0 
190.8 
334.2 
288.4 
283.75 
329.8 
329.8 
Table 4. Water needed to Iupport on shale popu-
lation and potential agricultural acreage 
affected In the Vemal area BIIuming new 
town Is CODltructed. 
Population Water a Acreageb 
Year impact needed affected 
Commercial Stage 
Phase I 
5 299 74.75 24.9 
6 410 102.5 34.16 
7 546 136.5 45.5 
8 909 227.25 75.75 
9 746 186.5 62.16 
10 719 179.75 59.9 
Commercial Stage 
Phase II 
11-15 826 206.5 68.83 
16-20 826 206.5 68.83 
aBased on estimate of .25 acre feet per capita. 
bBased on estimate of 3.0 acre feet per acre . 
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The present population served by the Springs 
would include Vernal City, all of the area outside of 
the Vernal City limits within Ashley Valley 
connected to the system, the Maeser Water District 
area (this is the northwest corner of Ashley Valley), 
and the Jensen area. The following number of 
connections currently exist on the total system (30 
November 1975 estimate, Uintah County-Vernal 
City Planning Commission, 1970): 
1670 - Inside Vernal City 
1620 - Outside Vernal City, but on the City's 
system 
460 - Maeser District area 
120 - Jensen 
Maeser sets its own rates which are comparable to 
Vernal City's rates. For those outside of Vernal 
City but on its system, the rates are approximately 
double the rate charged inside the city. 
According to the Water and Sewer Plan for 
Ulntah County prepared by Despain Planning 
Associates in 1970, and the Vernal City records, 
water rights held by Vernal City for water through 
the line from Ashley Springs include: 
1. Steinaker Reservoir storage which the city 
exchanged for Ashley Springs water in the 
amount of 1,400 acre feet divided as 
follows: 
a. 750 a.f.-Vernal City in its own right. 
b. 200 a.f.-Transferred to Vernal City 
by Naples Water Company. 
c. lSO .a.f.-Transferred to Vernal City 
by Ashley Water Company. 
d. 300 a.f.-Transferred to Vernal City 
by Glines-Davis Water Company. 
The water is available on a year-round 
basis. 
2. Ashley Central Irrigation Company Water 
Stock (Mutual Irrigation Company) total-
ing approximately 4,112.95 acre feet. 
This water is available year round. 
3. Ashley Upper Irrigation Company Water 
Stock (Mutual Irrigation Company) which 
is equal to approximately 34.30 acre feet 
available year round. 
4. Ashley Valley Reservoir Company Water 
Stock totaling approximately 503.52 acre 
feet available year round. 
5. Diligence Rights Claim No. 1370, for 3.5 
cfs (2529 acre feet/year) from Ashley 
Springs on a year-round basis. 
To Ashley Springs 
MAESER 
WATER 
DISTRICT 
-- Water system owned by Vernal City. 
but outside of the city limits 
December 1975 
Flpre3. 
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6. Application to Appropriate Water for 
Municipal Purposes No. 24219 (not yet 
perfected) for 5 second feet (3600 acre 
feet/year) from Ashley Springs for use 
from October to April. 
7. Application to Appropriate Water for 
Municipal Purposes No. 24341 (not yet 
perfected) for 2,000 acre feet on a year-
round basis from Ashley Springs by ex-
change from Ashley Creek and Trout 
Creek Reservoir. 
The Ma~ser District also holds rights to the 
Ashley Springs water. These rights include some 
200 acre feet of storage water in Steinaker 
Reservoir used for exchange for water diverted into 
the system from the springs for use during the 
irrigation season and stock in the Ashley Upper · 
and Central Irrigation Companies amounting to 
460 acre feet (Uintah County-Vernal City Planning 
Commission, 1970). 
Based upon the information presented above, 
rights currently held by Vernal City and the Maeser 
District provide access to 9,244 acre feet of water. 
This total does not include amounts from the 
unperfected rights. Also, the area may not have full 
use of Diligence Right No. 1370 for 2,533 acre feet 
since it is subject to other prior rights. Thus, 
Ashley Valley has clear and unrestricted use to 
6,710.77 acre feet. 
The current population of Ashley Valley is 
approximately 13,700. The basis for this estimate is 
a housing study and actual housing count taken in 
December 1974, and continually updated. There-
fore, based on current population and water 
figures, the residents of Asbley Valley have access 
to .49 acre feet of water per capita. If the water for 
Diligence Right No. 1370 is included, the figure 
jumps to .69 acre feet per capita. 
According to most sources, including local 
community leadership, flow from the springs is 
more than adequate to meet the needs of the area's 
residents. At present use rates and water prices, the 
springs alone would be able to supply triple the 
demands of the current popUlation (USBR, 1973). 
There are also indications that current use in the 
valley is unusually high. In 1974, the average 
annual consumption of water within the Vernal 
City system was .49 acre feet per capita. Most 
studies indicate a figure of .25 acre feet per capita 
is indicative of national domestic water consump-
tion patterns. The previous chapter's discussion on 
the response of water use to price may suggest that 
per capita use would decline in response to higher 
water rates. Also, older parts of the water system 
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need to be repaired and improved and , if done; 
water waste could be prevented. 
Thus, it appears that high quality water 
supplies are available for projected domestic uses. 
The problem arises in acquiring the rights to use 
that water. Agricultural rights presently encompass 
the majority of the flow rights from Ashley Springs. 
Therefore, a transfer of water from agricultural 
uses to municipal uses would necessitate a transfer 
of right. 
According to the Vernal City Manager, steps 
have already been taken to insure the transfer of 
agricultural water used on land that has been or 
would be taken out of agricultural production and 
incorporated in the city for municipal purposes. 
Vernal City presently requires water stock owner-
ship to be transferred to the city for each water 
connection added "where there exist water rights 
attached to the property desiring to be served with 
the new water connection." This water stock is 
actually shares held in the various canal companies 
which exist in the area referred to earlier in this 
section. 
The city pays $45 for the water stock required 
for a culinary water connection. The fraction of a 
share required to provide this water is different for 
each individual irrigation company since a share in 
one company does not involve the same amount of 
water as in another company. The fractions 
required are as follows: 
1. Ashley Central - 1 I 20th share 
2. Ashley Upper - 1/10th share 
3. Ashley Valley Reservoir - 2-1/4th shares 
4. Island Ditch Company - 1 share 
5. Rock Point Canal Company - 1/8 th share 
All these fractions have equal value in terms of acre 
feet of water. 
Whether or not this amount represents fair 
compensation is a difficult matter to determine. 
According to local officials the figure of $45 was 
arrived at by a fair market value determination by 
members of the Ashley Valley Water Users 
Association. Discussions with local irrigation offi-
cials indicate that the amount reflects the current 
prices which water shares are being sold for in the 
area. However, the prices which energy developers 
could pay for this water might be considerably 
higher. The present holders of rights understand 
this and translate it into an expectation that water 
prices may rise. The evidence in this study, 
however, is that this expectation may well be 
. unfounded unless large-scale commerical opera-
tions begin. 
Another area of concern is obtaining adequate 
rights for approved exchange purposes so that the 
higher quality water from the Ashley Springs can . 
be available for municipal and industrial uses. 
Thus, plans call for the city to get rights for water 
to be developed under the Jensen Reclamation 
Project of the Central Utah Project. This is 
discussed below. 
The courts appear to be one avenue being 
explored by both Vernal City and local agricultural 
users to define water rights and powers of 
communities to obtain these rights. There are a 
number of cases pending before local and state 
courts to define and settle various disputes over 
water usage. Some even involve potential condem-
nation of water for public purposes in order to 
supply domestic needs. 
In summary, there appears to be excess water 
from the Ashley Springs to supply the oil shale 
population over and above the quantity supplied to 
the existing agricultural sectors. Nonetheless, in 
the event of continued population growth Vernal 
City will have to take measures to insure that this 
excess water is transferred to the city. 
The Central Utah Project-
the Vernal Unit 
The Vernal Unit (see map of Vernal Unit) 
provides irrigation and municipal water to Ashley 
Valley and is essentially complete. The unit has 
been supplying water to the valley for more than 
ten years. 
The major features of the unit are the 
Steinaker Dam and Reservoir, Fort Thornburgh 
Diversion Dam, Steinaker Feeder Canal, and 
Steinaker Service Canal. 
Water is diverted from the Ashley Creek at 
Fort Thornburgh Diversion Dam some two miles 
west of Maeser and delivered to Steinaker 
Reservoir by the feeder canal. The unit supplies 
about 18,000 acre feet of water each year for 
supplemental irrigation and about 1,600 acre feet 
for municipal use. This water is used as exchange 
water for flow from Ashley Springs. All water is 
currently purchased and is presently being utilized 
(USBR, 1973). 
The supplemental water supply firms up the 
previous undependable supply, and in particular 
late irrigation season water, to about 15,000 acres 
of cultivated land. The 1,600 acre feet of municipal 
water is sufficient to provide water for 3,300 
persons at a consumption rate of .49 acre feet per 
capita (USBR, 1973). The Green River is depleted 
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by 12,000 acre feet per year as a result of the Vernal 
Unit. This results from reservoir evaporation, 
domestic use, and irrigation consumptive use. 
The Jensen Unit 
The Jensen Unit (see map of Jensen Unit) will 
provide additional irrigation water for the Jensen 
area and augment municipal water supplies to the 
Ashley Valley-Vernal City area. The unit was 
scheduled for construction in 1974, but environ-
mental and economic problems have hampered its 
beginning. Most of these problems have now been 
resolved, and on May 25, 1976, voters in the 
Uintah Water Conservancy District overwhelm-
ingly approved the $33,000,000 commitment to the 
federal government to get construction on the unit 
started. 
The main features of the unit will be the 
Tyzack Dam and Reservoir, Aqueduct, Pumping 
Plant, and the Burns Pumping Plant. The dam and 
reservoir will be located on Big Brush Creek 
approximately 3 miles south from the Utah 
Highway 44 crossing. 
The unit will develop 4,700 acre feet of water 
for irrigation purposes in the Jensen area, and 
18,000 acre feet for municipal and industrial 
purposes in the Ashley Valley area (USBR, 1973). 
Plans call for the immediate purchase of 7,200 
acre feet of municipal water by Vernal City with 
additional purchases when needed. This 18,000 
acre feet would provide the water to meet the 
domestic demands of 38,000 additional persons at 
a consumption rate of .49 acre feet per capita 
(USBR, 1973). 
To transfer the municipal water from the 
proposed reservoir to Vernal a four-mile buried 
aqueduct will be constructed. The water would be 
pumped over the ridge to the west of the reservoir 
and then flow by gravity to Steinaker Reservoir. 
The project will make the high quality water from 
Ashley Springs currently used by irrigators 
available to Vernal City in exchange for water 
delivered to Steinaker Reservoir for irrigation 
purposes. 
The exact repayment schedule for the project 
has not been finally determined but discussions 
with the Bureau of Reclamation officials indicate 
the charges to municipal and industrial users will 
approach $100 per acre foot. This amount will 
cover operation and maintenance and interest 
costs. Although few studies into the value of 
agricultural water in the Uintah Basin have been 
conducted, comparative data would indicate that 
the value of agricultural water would be in the 
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neighborhood of $10 per acre foot . Vernal City 
officials indicate that the transaction costs associ-
ated with obtaining agricultural water directly 
without replacement water will make the buying of 
Jensen Unit water, even at the price of $100 per 
acre foot , necessary. Under terms of the agreement 
all water obtained from the Jensen Unit will be 
exchanged for water from Ashley Springs on a one 
for one basis. The water from the Springs will 
require very little treatment to meet domestic 
quality standards and the exchange water will still 
meet irrigation quality standards. 
The future of the Jensen Unit was once very 
cloudy, but it now appears that construction on the 
unit will go ahead without major obstacles. 
Conversations with state water officials indicate 
that oil shale and other energy concerns provided 
much of the impetus behind getting the project off 
the ground. 
In summary, it appears, on the surface at 
least, that there is plenty of water to meet 
additional demand due to oil shale population. 
Even without the lensen Unit, Ashley Springs 
would be able to provide this additional quantity. 
This does not necessarily mean that there will be no 
water given up by agriculture for municipal uses, 
however. Agricultural production requires land as 
well as water. As the population reaches out from 
current city boundaries, agricultural land will be 
taken out of production as a by-product of 
annexation, etc. As the land goes, so will the water. 
What is clear, however, is that no irrigated acreage 
need be left without adequate irrigation water 
because of development of the oil shale prototype 
plant. 
IMPACT OF OIL SHALE DEVELOPMENT 
ON AGRICULTURE 
There has been much speculation about the 
impact energy development will have on existing 
water uses in Eastern Utah and the energy-rich 
West in general. Since the majority of the existing 
water allocations are for agricultural purposes this 
impact is generally thought of as a confrontation 
between the demand for agricultural and energy 
development uses. Concern has been expressed 
that agriculture, being unable to compete with 
energy as water shortages drive up prices, will sell 
off its water to the higher paying use. In the long 
run this situation is indeed possible if energy 
development occurs on a large scale in the years 
ahead. In such an eventuality, energy development 
will use very large quantities of water. 
It has been shown earlier in this report, 
however, that the prototype oil shale operation will 
not seriously compete with the agricultural 
economy for water. The location proposed for the 
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industrial operation is in an area which is not 
currently utilized for agricultural production, and 
the municipal growth demands can be satisfied by 
the existing communities. In other words, sufficient 
supplies are available to satisfy existing and 
projected demand at approximately current relative 
prices for water. 
There are additional impediments to transfers 
of water from agricultural uses to energy develop-
ment. Defining water rights and transferring them 
from agriculture to other uses involves substantial 
transaction costs. 
It is the purpose of this section of the report to 
present some of the institutional constraints which 
make transfers of water on a purely economic basis 
a costly operation . Water rights transfers are often 
viewed as a simple exchange of property. Although 
water rights are legally considered as a species of 
real property and, therefore, transferable on the 
market, in reality such transfers are subject to a 
number of legal and institutional constraints. 
All water rights on a given stream or river are 
closely integrated with each other. Any action 
(including transfer) which injures any other right is 
prohibited by law. Therefore, a right may be 
transferred only so long as it does not affect other 
integrated rights. In general, this may be a difficult 
accomplishment. 
Consider a typical situation: 
20 
efs 
Lam X 
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2 efs ---
Assume that stream X has a total flow of 20 cfs 
in the main water course which is completely 
allocated. User A has a right to divert 5 cfs for use 
on his land, as illustrated in the diagram. Let us 
suppose that irrigation efficiency is 60 percent. 
Efficiency is defined as the quantity of water con-
sumptively used as a percentage of the amount 
diverted. Therefore, 3 cfs are consumptively used 
on A's property by irrigation. The remaining 2 cfs 
......... - ......... , . "\~ . 
become return flow to the stream. User B has an 
inferior right to A for 4 cfs. The remaining flow of 
the stream is utilized among other downstream 
users. If an energy concern, or any other potential 
buyer, were to buy A's right, how much water 
would the buyer be entitled to? 
Although B's right is inferior to A's, B's right 
is protected against any action which would 
damage his right. B's water right is dependent 
upon A's return flow; therefore, if A were to 
transfer his water right, he would only be able to 
sell 3 cfs out of his total right of S cfs since the other 
2 cfs are return flow upon which other rights are 
dependent. The same situation exists for B in that 
his return flow represents other downstream water 
rights. In other words, the usual interpretation is 
that only the consumptive use may be transferred. 
This hypothetical situation represents an 
obstacle to water right transfers. The transaction 
costs are essentially threefold in nature: the first is 
the technical question of how much of a right is 
legally transferable. The second problem is legal in 
that every transfer is subject to protest and judicial 
review. The third problem is economic-if prob-
lems one and two are solved without cost, the value 
of 3 cfs in the new use must be worth more than the 
S cfs diverted in the original use if transfer is to be 
profitable to the original user. 
Another frequently mentioned aspect regard-
ing the availability of irrigation water for energy 
uses is that of providing farmers with sufficient 
economic incentive to increase the efficiency of 
their irrigation practices so as to make more water 
available. It is well known that flood irrigation, as 
practiced in the Uintah Basin, is highly inefficient. 
Therefore, if the farmer were to be rewarded for 
increasing irrigation efficiency through installation 
of sprinkler irrigation, for example, he would 
ostensibly be able to sell the saved water to energy 
demanders. As an example, if user A could 
increase his irrigation efficiency to 7S percent, he 
would need to divert only 4 cfs to get consumptive 
use of 3 cfs and could thus sell the 1 cfs saved. 
A more penetrating view of this example, 
however, reveals that the problems cited above 
remain. The first is the problem of return flow. No 
matter what efforts are taken to increase the 
efficiency of water use, the return flow figure may 
not be altered if crop requirements require a given 
consumptive use. This situation highlights the old 
adage, "One man's inefficiency is another man's 
water right." The Colorado River is fully utilized 
before it runs into the Gulf of California and 
increasing irrigation efficiency will not add to water 
availability. 
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There is a second legal question. Water rights 
are granted so that water can be put to reasonable 
and beneficial use. If it is shown that increased 
irrigation efficiency results in a surplus of water 
which is not being put to such a designated use, the 
possibility exists that the amount of saved water 
would revert back to the state to be reallocated 
rather than being salable to other users by the 
original individual water right holder. This is an 
area of speculation, however, since there are no 
immediate precedents to govern this decision. 
It is possible that some ' statutory action 
guaranteeing that such saved water is property of 
the water right holder would enable him to sell off 
the saved portion of his right. If so, an obvious 
economic incentive would exist for the farmer to 
increase irrigation efficiency. 
Another possible deterrent to water transfers 
from agriculture to energy involves irrigation 
organizations. A major part of the irrigation in the 
Uintah Basin is handled through mutual irrigation 
companies. The members of these companies are 
stockholders. Such stock provides each shareholder 
with a given amount of irrigation water or a given ' 
percentage of the stream flow. The water right 
itself, however, is held in the name of the company. 
Most company bylaws prohibit the sale of stock for 
use outside of the company or for non-agricultural 
purposes without the unanimous consent of the 
stockholders. Since unanimity is often difficult to 
achieve, the question that arises is how might non-
agricultural concerns obtain such water. 
One alternative is for energy to buyout whole 
farms, obtain the corresponding stock, and leave 
the farms in agricultural production until a 
majority of the stock is held by the energy 
operation. When such a position is achieved the 
majority portion of the stock held by the energy 
developers could be severed from the other stock 
held by the irrigation company. At least, the energy 
developers would be in a strong bargaining 
position. Again, there is no legal precedent to guide 
such action. There is, of course, the option of 
buying out all of the shareholders and then 
transferring the water to industrial uses. 
A final problem in obtaining agricultural 
water rights concerns municipal zoning ordinances 
which stipulate how agricultural water is to be used 
once it leaves agricultural production. Such zoning 
laws require that once the water leaves agricultural 
prod uction the control of the water reverts to the 
city. This situation applies only in areas under city 
control, however. But as cities and towns anticipate 
increased popUlation and expand their boundaries, 
more agricultural land may find itself subject to 
municipal control as a means of obtaining the 
water. 
The previous pages have not meant to imply 
that existing agricultural rights will never be taken 
for energy development. On the contrary; if large 
scale development should occur then water use in 
agriculture may be reduced. In that case large 
numbers of agricultural rights will be purchased 
together to obtain the necessary water and avoid 
legal entanglements. The proposed prototype oil 
shale operation simply does not need enough water 
to warrant piecing small individual water rights 
together and facing the legal problems. This is 
particularly true when the water for the operation is 
available from other sources. 
What then will be the impact of the proposed 
prototype oil shale development of lease tracts U a 
and Ub on the local agricultural production? 
White River Oil Shale Corporation has stated 
categorically that there will be no use of existing 
agricultural rights for the prototype plant. All the 
evidence that has been available seems to support 
this claim. Efforts have been directed toward 
obtaining water from sources that have not been 
appropriated, such as the White River. It appears 
that these efforts have succeeded and the proposed 
dam will be built. The location of the lease tracts is 
such that no existing agricultural production will 
be affected. 
If anything, it appears that the proposed oil 
shale development might well have a positive 
impact on some areas of agriculture resources. 
Industry, in its efforts to obtain the necessary water 
from the Slate, appears willing to subsidize 
agriculture. For example, the proposed White 
River Dam, although built primarily to provide 
water for oil shale, will ' in fact assist local 
agriculture by making it possible to irrigate some 
Indian land and by providing some flood control 
protection. 
Population impacts, although significant, do 
not appear to be substantial enough to involve 
significant transfers of water from agriculture to 
municipal uses. This is particularly true if water for 
the Jensen Unit of the Central Utah Project is 
developed .. Lastly, the legal and institutional 
constraints to efforts by energy to buy up small 
individual water rights on a piecemeal basis seem 
to be quite costly. 
CONCLUSION 
Investigation into the physical availability of 
water in the oil shale area reveals that the prototype 
oil shale plant will ~ve little impact on the Uintah 
Basin's agricultural or municipal water supplies. 
28 
Water use for the prototype plant is estimated 
between 13,000 acre feet per year and 26,000 acre 
feet per year. The difference between these 
estimates is the amount of water that will be used 
for dust control and cooling. If a new town is 
developed the additional municipal water for the 
projected popUlation of 10,028 (see Table 2) will 
also have to be supplied by water near the 
prototype site. Based upon a consumption rate of 
.49 acre feet per capita (current Vernal City 
consumption rate) the on-site popUlation will have 
to be supplied with an additional 4,914 acre feet 
per year. This consumption rate is very high, 
however. Raising the price of water discussed 
earlier, might lower this amount significantly. If a 
consum ption rate of .25 acre feet per capita is 
assumed (Project Independence estimates) the 
domestic water estimates are lowered to 2,507 acre 
feet per year. Thus, the prototype plant and a new 
town of 10,028 would require a high estimate of 
30,914 acre feet per year and a low estimate of 
15,507 acre feet per year (see Tables 5 and 7). 
A look at the water supply side reveals that the 
36,000 acre feet currently proposed for segregation 
from the White River Dam would more than supply. 
the high estimate of 30,914 acre feet per year 
(Tables 6 and 7). It should be mentioned, however, 
that the proposed dam with its 118,000 acre feet of 
storage will supply room for some expansion of the 
prototype operation. (Note: At least 50,000 acre 
feet will be designated for Indian rights.) 
At this time, it appears unlikely that a new 
town will be built. Therefore, the popUlation 
impact discussed earlier would have to be absorbed 
by existing Uintah Basin communities . A look at 
the projected population increases in Vernal, 
Roosevelt , and Duchesne indicates an anticipated 
popUlation increase for that area of 6,011 persons. 
Utilizing the higher consumption rate of .49 acre 
feet per capita this popUlation increase would 
require some 3,253 acre feet per year. The lower 
rate of .25 acre feet per capita projects a total of 
1,661 acre feet per year. Examination of the water 
supply side for this same area, however, reveals 
that 40,195 acre feet per year may eventually be 
available for municipal and industrial use in the 
Uintah Basin (see Tables 6 and 7). 
In summary, the prototype oil shale operation 
and the associated population increase will have no 
apparent impact on the Uintah Basin agricultural 
or municpal water supplies. 
Of course, these estimates incorporate only the 
impact of the prototype operation of a maximum 
cap.acity of 100,000 barrels/day. If oil shale 
operations were to become economically feasible, 
water demands could expand rapidly. Other large 
energy developments, i.e., coal gasification and 
liquefaction, could also expand quickly and 
demand huge quantities of water. The question 
then arises as to the capacities of existing water 
supplies to support a large scale population 
increase and further ind ustrial development. 
Based on the low consumption rate of .25 acre 
feet per capita the 40,195 acre feet available to the 
Uintah Basin would support a population of over 
150,000. The limiting factor, as far as water for oil 
shale is concerned, appears to be the industrial 
water from the White River Dam. If an additional 
26,000 acre feet per year is required for each 
100,000 barrel/day operation, the White River pro-
ject would only be able to supply sufficient water 
for a 200,000 barrell day industry before impinging 
Table 5. Water requirement demand summary for 
the prototype 00 shale development at 
various population assumptions. 
1. Proto,type oil shale plant 
(max. capacity 100,000 
barrels/day) 
Population: 
2. Total estimated popula-
tion increase (including 
Rangely, Colorado) 
12,535 
3. On-site population 
(assumes new town) 
10,028 
4. Vernal-Ashley Valley 
(assumes no new town) 
3,958 
5. Roosevelt 
(no new town) 
1,574 
6. Duchesne 
(no new town) 
479 
7. Other Uintah Basin 
(no new town) 
627 
Totals: 
Plant totals and total 
population water 
estimates (1,2) 
Total estimated Utah (Uintah Basin) water 
requirement (assumes no 
new town) (4,5,6,7) 
Plant total and total Uintah 
Ba~in population water 
estimate (assumes no new 
town) (1,4,5,6,7) 
aAssumes .49 a.f. per capita 
b Assumes .25 a.f. per capita 
High Estimate Low Estimate 
(a.f./yr) (a.f./yr) 
26,000 13,000 
1,940 990 
771 394 
235 120 
307 157 
32,142 16,134 
3,253 1,661 
29,253 14,661 
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upon Indian claims, providing additional water 
supplies cannot be found. 
Examination of the institutional and legal 
framework of the appropriative doctrine in general 
and of Utah water law specifically reveals that the 
basic orientation of such laws is protective of 
existing water rights. They are protected from 
harm from other potential water users even though 
a given water use may be more beneficial in an 
economic sense. 
Although water rights are considered real 
property statutorily and are transferable on the 
open market, in reality transfers are restricted by 
current laws unless the criterion of non-injury to 
other water rights is met. The fundamental 
Table 6. Water supply summary. 
Prototype plant operation 
(max. capacity 100,000 
Vernal-Ashley Valley 
(clear and unrestricted rights) 
Rights where title may be 
under dispute 
Future sources-Jensen Unit 
Subtotal 
Roosevelt 
Uriah Heap Springs, Hancock 
Cove Well, Campbell Well 
Duchesne 
Murray Springs Area Wells 
Totals: 
White River Dam and 
Uintah Basin sources 
Uintah Basin sources 
Proposed White River Dam 
segregation of 36,000 a.f. 
from total of 118,000 a.f. 
storage 
6,711 
8,153 
18,000 
32,863 
5,718 
76,195 
40,195 
Table 7. Summary comparison of total plant aDd 
population water estimates and total 
Ulntah Basin and White River Dam water 
supply sources. 
Req uiremen t/ Needs 
1. Total plant water 
High 
a.f./yr 
requirements and 
total pop,ulation 
water estimates 32,142 
2. Total plant water 
requirements and 
new town water 
Low 
aJ./yr Supply 
Uintah Basin 
sources-
16,134 40,195 a.f. 
estimates 30,914 15,507 
3. Total plant water 
requirements and 
total estimated 
Uintah Basin popu-
lation water esti-
mates (assume no 
new town) 29,253 14,661 
Uintah Basin 
sources-and 
White River Dam 
76,195 a.f. 
underpining of the appropriative doctrine is 
preservation of the existing right at the expense of 
later rights. The primary goal of the institutional 
apparatus of the state (the water law and the office 
of the State Engineer) is the maintenance of an 
"equitable" distribution of this public resource. 
Unfortunately, this desire for equity often 
conflicts with efforts to maximize efficiency in 
water use. It has been shown in this study that 
although the value productivity of water used in 
energy production is significantly higher than that 
of water utilized in agriculture, efforts by energy to 
bid water away from agriculture are often severely 
restricted by current legal and institutional 
restraints. Water may be kept in a less productive 
use by the high transaction costs associated with 
transferring water rights. Transfers must be 
preceded by public hearings and the burden of 
proof of non-injury to other right holders is on the 
parties wishing the transfer. This often requires 
technical information that is expensive to acquire. 
Because of these transaction costs, oil shale 
developers may well find it easier and less costly to 
obtain the needed water from the state's supply of 
unallocated water, at least for the prototype 
development. 
It has not been the intention of this study to 
imply that the preservation of existing agricultural 
rights is of greater importance than obtaining 
water for oil shale development. Rather, the 
orientation has been to present the current legal 
and institutional impediments to water right 
transfers. Obviously, these restrictions are geared 
toward preservation of already granted rights. A 
question might arise, however, concerning the 
impact on agriculture and other rights if such 
restrictions did not exist or if the institutional 
structure were modified te accommodate easier 
transfer. 
It is generally accepted that if agriculture were 
stripped of the protection it now enjoys that it 
would not be able to compete economically with 
municipal and industrial demands. This is 
particularly true with respect to energy operations 
such as oil shale where the demand price for water 
is quite high and the demand curve for water is 
likely highly inelastic. Expenditures for water 
constitute a very small proportion of the total costs 
of producing oil from shale and no good substitutes 
are available for water in such uses as soil 
compaction and revegetation. This is tantamount 
to arguing that the demand curve for water can be 
expected to be highly inelastic. Thus, no one seems 
to argue that oil shale producers could not bid 
water away from agricultural users. In an economic 
welfare context, however, would this necessarily 
imply a reduction in social welfare? 
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If transaction costs were zero, if transfers were 
made voluntarily, and if no external costs and 
benefits were imposed on others, the free market 
solution to the water allocation problem would in 
reality conduce to maximum economic welfare. 
Water would move to its highest value and 
economic efficiency criteria would be satisfied. But 
how about equity? It must be assumed that if a 
farmer is receiving sufficient incentive to part with 
his agricultural water in the market in a voluntary 
transaction, that he prefers the transfer to 
maintaining his right. Likewise, the energy 
developer would be receiving the use of a resource 
for which he had compensated the farmer. 
Neither party can be considered to be worse off 
and, therefore, the Pareto conditions for an 
optimum are satisfied. This situation reflects the 
basic free market belief that with the exception of 
resource transactions involving externalities, the 
market allocates resources on the most efficient 
and equitable basis (Mishan, 1969). 
There would be some secondary economic 
effects associated with any decline in agricultural 
production in the proposed oil shale area, however. 
Support industries such as equipment retailers, 
fertilizer suppliers, transport and marketing firms, · 
would appear to be worse off if agriculture 
declined. The area's economic position in general, 
however, may not be negatively affected since 
presumably oil shale development would bring with 
it jobs, increased commerce and incomes, and 
more tax revenue. Thus, other secondary busi-
nesses would gain and these gains would appear to 
more than offset the losses to the auxiliary 
agricultural industries. 
The conclusion of this study is that current 
water laws and institutions will be an important 
factor in determining how and if water will be 
available for oil shale development. It has been 
publicly stated by Utah's prototype oil shale 
developers that the prototype operation will not 
attempt to utilize existing agricultural water rights 
or sources for the initial oil shale operation. This 
position reflects the belief that the transaction costs 
associated with obtaining this water are at the 
moment too high when compared with the 
possibility of obtaining water from other sources. 
On the basis of this information, it appears that oil 
shale development will not have any substantial 
impact on the area's agriculture in a direct sense. 
There is the possibility that popUlation increases 
associated with oil shale will require the affected 
communities to obtain the additional domestic 
water from agricultural sources. Proper manage-
ment coupled with efforts to define ownership of 
the area's water sources should eliminate many of 
the problems facing communities in obtaining the 
needed municipal water. Lastly, long delayed 
projects like the Jensen Unit of the Central Utah 
Project would eliminate most of the problems 
facing industry, municipalities, and agriculture in 
finding adequate water. 
Although there appears to be sufficient water 
to meet agriculture and energy demands in the 
Uintah Basin at the moment, the potential for 
conflict underlies a fundamental inadequacy of 
current water legislation, i.e., the inability of 
current water controls to adapt to dynamic change 
in water demand. Utah water law declares that all 
water in the state is to be considered the property of 
the public. This statement does not vest title to the 
water in the state, but does stipulate that water is 
community property available only upon compli-
ance with the law. Water, however, is a fugitive 
resource which is only of non-recreational value 
when it is taken from its source and is used. The 
role of institutional controls is ostensibly to 
manipulate the system to obtain the greatest public 
benefit. The system becomes onerous, however, 
when laws and organizations created to be the 
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manipulators prevent economically efficient 
transfers. 
Historically two methods have been employed 
to ration resources. One is legislative and 
administrative control. This is the method most 
commonly utilized in water allocation in Utah 
today. As a result, agricultural water has been 
heavily subsidized at the expense of municipal and 
industrial uses. This has been done by statute and 
administrative procedures influencing how water 
would be priced, assigned to land, and develop-
ment costs distributed. The other method is market 
allocation by price. What this study has pointed 
out is that current controls exist to the point that 
only rarely is there a free market for water 
(Gardner and Fullerton, 1968). 
Hopefully as the fact is faced that water will 
not be available for all potential competing uses, 
water institutions can be modified to permit this 
scarce resource to be allocated to uses and users of 
greatest productivity and still protect the equity 
positions held by current right holders. 
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PART II 
THE EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN THE 
V ARIABILITY OF WATER 
INTRODUCTION 
In many cases irrigation water is a random 
variable, i.e., its quantity is not known ahead of 
time. In these cases a transfer of irrigation water to 
an alternative use and/or an alternative drainage 
can affect the variability of the remaining water 
even though the average amount of remaining 
water is unchanged. For example if a portion of a 
stream flow water supply is diverted there are 
several ways that this can affect the variability of 
the remaining water. (1) The diversion of water 
within the system will be different; thus the return 
flow from diverted water will be different which can 
cause a change in the seasonality and variability of 
the water. (2) If originally a portion of the stream is 
diverted and now water is transferred at a constant 
rate, the remaining water will be more variable 
even if its average amount is unchanged. (3) If a 
water storage system is constructed on the stream 
and a portion of the water is transferred the most 
likely result would be a decrease in the variability 
and a change in the seasonality of water. In this last 
case, however, it is the storage facility that caused 
the decrease in the variability of water not the 
transfer. 
Both a change in the variability and in the 
seasonality of water have been introduced. 
However, the analysis will concentrate upon the 
effects of a change in the variability since the 
effects of change in seasonality have been analyzed 
extensively. A change in the variability of irrigation 
water can have an impact on local agriculture in 
several ways. It can affect (1) both the variability 
and average level of farm income (profits), (2) the 
prices of land and water, (3) the quantity of 
purchased inputs, and (4) the level of farm 
production (output). These effects are analyzed 
for the set of all affected farms. The analyses 
will be carried out for both the case where the 
farm 'managers are assumed to be risk indifferent 
and the case when they are assumed to be risk 
averters. 
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Before discussing these analyses, however, a 
review of a portion of the recent literature on the 
economics of uncertainty and a discussion of the 
techniques of analysis in this area will be 
presented. The purpose of this is to identify the 
type of analysis to be used and to state the reasons 
why this particular approach is used. The 
techniques of analysis are presented so that they 
can be referenced later. 
A PARTIAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
OF THE ECONOMICS OF 
UNCERTAINTY 
In the economics of uncertainty there are two 
main alternative hypotheses concerning human 
behavior. (1) It is hypothesized that individuals 
maximize expected (average) utility or alternatively 
(2) it is hypothesized that individuals maximize 
utility where utility is a function of expected 
(average) income or returns and risk. The proxy for 
risk is almost always the variance of income or 
returns. This second hypothesis is called the 
mean-variance hypothesis. Frequently it is hypothe-
sized that firms maximize expected profits. This, 
however, is not an alternative hypothesis since it 
can be shown to be contained within the first 
hypothesis as a special case. The two main 
hypotheses, however, are not equivalent. While for 
a large number of analyses the conclusions are 
identical, there are specific examples in the 
literature where the conclusions of the two 
approaches are different. 
The contradiction between the two can be 
viewed by examining some of the characteristics of 
the two models. In the maximization of expected 
utility analysis, it is hypothesized that utility is a 
nondecreasing function of income, U = U(I), and 
that the expected utility is maximized subject to the 
constraint of the available alternatives. For 
example, if x and yare two alternative sources of 
income and they are both random variables then, 
E(U(x)) > E(U(y)) 
implies x is preferred to y. In the mean-variance 
analysis, it is hypothesized that utility is a function 
of expected (average) income, E(I), and the 
variance of income (risk = oy2), U = U (E(I), oy2}. 
In addition, for the variance held constant U is 
assumed to be a nondecreasing function of 
expected income (a U / a E > 0). In this model utility 
is maximized subject to the available alternatives. 
For example, if x and yare two alternative sources 
of income and they are both random variables then 
U(E(x), a~ ) > U(E(y) , a~ ) 
implies x is preferred to y. 
In both of these models the terms risk 
aversion, risk neutrality, and risk preference are 
used. A person is risk averse if over a set of choices 
between a for sure alternative and a risky 
alternative with equal means he always selects the 
for sure alternative. He is risk netural if he is 
indifferent between all such comparisons, and he is 
risk preferent if he always selects the risky 
alternative . These three definitions imply for the 
expected utility hypothesis the following three 
equivalent definitions. A risk averter is a person 
with a concave utility function; a risk netural 
individual is one with a linear utility function; and 
a risk preferent person is one who has a convex 
utility function. For the mean-variance hypothes.is 
the original definitions are augmented to allow for 
comparisons of two risky alternatives. A person is 
risk averse if for all choices between two 
alternatives with equal means he selects the one 
with the lower variance (risk), and a person is risk 
preferent if he always selects the one with the 
higher risk. 1 
We are now in a position to demonstrate the 
contradiction between the two approaches. Let the 
distributions of x and y be those given in Table 1. 
In this example x has a higher mean and a lower 
variance than y; therefore by the mean-variance 
hypothesis, if the individual is risk ave ... ·se, x is 
preferred to y. However, if we suppose that the 
Table 1. Distributions for x and y. 
x 
1 
100 
E (x) 
Var (x) 
Pr(x) 
0.80 
0.20 
20.8 
1468 
y 
10 
1000 
E (y) 
Var (y) 
Pr(y) 
0.99 
0.01 
19.9 
9703 
IThe assumption that choices are transitive implies that the 
definition of a risk neutral person does not need to be augmented. 
utility function is U(I) = log I , which is strictly 
concave, then E(U(x» = 0.4 and E(U(y» = 1.02. 
Thus under the expected utility hypothesis y is 
preferred to x (Hanoch and Levy, 1969). In this 
example the two hypotheses order these two 
alternatives differently. 
The expected utility maximization hypothesis 
is the more general of the two, is built upon an 
axiomatic system of behavior under uncertainty 
(Arrow, 1971), while the other is not, and offers 
more promise for explaining human behavior. Thus 
since the two do not agree, the contradiction is a 
sign of a deficiency in the mean-variance approach. 
With the demonstration in the literature that 
there are problems associated with defining an 
increase in the variance to be an increase in risk has 
come an increased interest in alternative definitions 
of an increase in risk. Rothschild and Stiglitz have 
proposed three equivalent definitions (Rothschild 
and Stiglitz , 1970). The random variable y is more 
variable, or riskier or more uncertain than another 
random variable x if: 
1. y is equal to x plus noise. 
2. Every risk averter prefers x to y. 
3. y has more weight in its tails than x. 
In all three it is assumed that x and y have the same 
mean. Number one says that y is distributed as x 
plus z where z is a random variable (r.v.) with zero 
mean. Number two says that if 
E(U(x» ~ E(U(y» 
for all concave U than x is less risky than y. In 
number three, "if x and y have density functions f 
and g, and if g was obtained from f by taking some 
of the probability weight from the center of f and 
adding it to each tail of f in such a way as to leave 
the mean unchanged" then y is more uncertain 
than x (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970). This shift of 
probability weight from the center to the tails is 
called "a mean preserving spread." 
These three definitions give rise to a common 
partial ordering of random variables or of their 
cumulative density functions (c .d.f.'s). The order-
ing is a partial ordering since there are c.d.f.'s that 
cannot be ordered by the three definitions. 
However , if this happens for two random variables, 
say x and y, then it is possible to fmd a risk averter 
that prefers x to y and another risk averter that 
prefers y to x. Thus it is ambiguous as to which is 
the riskier of the two. The ordering given by the 
variance is a complete ordering, and it orders the 
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ambiguous case just described. These ambiguous 
cases give rise to the cases discussed above where 
the mean-variance analysis and the expected utility 
analysis disagree. 
RISK A VERTERS AND THE MEAN 
PRESERVING SPREAD 
To illustrate the effects of a mean preserving 
spread upon a risk averter we examine a for sure 
and a risky alternative. The for sure alternative is x 
dollars and the risky alternative is Xl dollars with a 
probability of 1/2 and X2 with a probability of 1/2, 
with 
x =.Lx +.Lx 2 1 2 2 
In this example we start with all of the probability 
weight located at the center of the distribution. 
One-half of the weight is then shifted to Xl and 
one-half to X2 with Xl and X2 selected so that the 
original mean is preserved. 
Let U(x) be the risk averter's utility function, 
and assume that U(x) is strictly concave. The 
expected level of utility for the for sure alternative 
is 
EF(V(x)) = Vex) 
and for the risky alternative is 
EG(V(x)) = .L V(x l ) +.L V(x2 ) 2 2 
The problem is diagrammed in Figure 1. With all 
of the weight at x the mean level of utility is U (X) 
which is indicated by the point A. Then as weight is 
shifted away from Y, values of the function above 
and below x receive weight. For the example U(xJ 
and U (xz) are weighted evenly. The effect of this 
weighting is given by the point B. Since U(x) is 
strictly concave this shifting of probability weight 
to the tails caused the mean value of U to fall. 
Similarly as the weight is shifted further and 
further into the tails values of the function further 
away from U (X) are given weight and the mean 
value of U will fall still further. Thus the more 
weight that is put into the tails holding the mean 
level of x constant the riskier is the alternative and 
the lower is the mean value of U. Consequently, the 
more weight that there is in the tails the less 
attractive the alternative is to a risk averter. 
The conclusions that 
v (x) > .L V (x ) + .L V (x ) 2 1 2 2 
also follows directly from the definition of a strictly 
concave function. U strictly concave means that for 
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all Xl and X2 in the domain of U and all t in the 
open interval (0, 1) that 
Letting t = 1/2 and noting that x = 1/2 Xl + 1/2 
X2 we get 
Vex) > .L V(x l ) +.L V (x2 ) 2 2 
The same conclusions can be shown to hold for 
more general cases using the appropriate tools. 
Consider a family of cumulative distribution 
functions F(x, r) where X is a random variable 
defined over the interval [a, b] and r is a shift 
parameter. The c.d.f. is assumed to be twice 
continuously differentiable in both x and r. Let r2 
be greater than rl' F(x,rz} is a mean preserving 
spread of F(x, rJ means 
b f. [F(x, r2) - F(x , r l)] dx = 0 ......... (1) 
and 
Y fa F(x,r2)-F(x , rl)dx~ 0 a~y~ ... (2) 
An alternative definition of c.d.f.'s that are "close" 
to each other is 
and 
b f F rex, r) dx = 0 
a 
................. (la) 
T(y,r)= fY Fr(x , r)dx~ 0 
a 
U(x) 
U(i) 
1/2Ulx,)1 
+1/2U(X2) 
............... (2a) 
/'1 //~ I 
/ I 
B I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Figure 1. E[U(I)] and U(E[I». 
I 
II 
where Fr(x, r) is the partial derivative of F with 
respect to r. Equations land la insure .that mean 
of x is unchanged by the change ill r, and 
Equations 2 and 2a insure th~t as r is ~~creased 
more weight is placed in the tatls. In addItIon, the 
distribution F(x, rJ is said to be less risky than 
F(x, r:z} if Equations land 2 hold. Thi~ is 
symbolized as F(x, rJ ~I .F(x, rz} where ~I IS a 
partial ordering. 
The partial ordering given by the set of all risk 
averters is symbolized by ~u' With the mean of x 
for rl and r2 equal, F(x, rJ is said to be less risky 
than F(x, r:z} if every risk averter prefers rl to r2' 
That is 
b 
F(x, r )~. F(x , r ) -f U(x)F x(x , r 1) dx 
1 u 2 a 
b ~ f U(x) Fx(x, r) dx ...... (3) 
a 
for every bounded concave function V . F x is the 
partial derivative with respect to x and. i~ t~e 
density function; thus when expected utlhty IS 
higher for rl than r2, F(x, rJ ia less risky than 
F(x, r:z}. Alternatively for "close" c.d.f. 's, the 
partial ordering ~u indicates an increase in risk if, 
and only if, 
b 
E = aE(U(x)) = J U(x) F (x r) dx ~ 0 . (3a) 
r ar a rx ' 
for every bounded concave function V. 
The partial orderings ~I and ~u are 
equivalent. This equivalence is stated in the 
following theorem: 
Theorem l: Let (1) 'Il be the set of all bounded 
concave, twice continuously differentiable utility 
functions, (2) F be twice continuously differentiable 
in x and r, and (3) ~u be defined over'll. Given (1), 
(2), (3) then the partial orderings ~u and ~I are 
identical, that is 
F(x, r1 ) ~I F(x, r2 ) -- F(x, r1 ) ~u F(x, r2 ) 
Proof: First 
b 
E =/ U(x)Frx (x, r) dx 
r a 
= U(b) Fr(b, r) - U(a) Fr(a, r) - [UI(b) T(b , r) 
b 
- UI(a) T(a, r)] + f T(x, r) U"(x) dx 
a 
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which is generated by twice integrating by parts. 
Since we are only comparing c.d.f.'s with the same 
mean T(b, r) = T(a, r) = 0, and because F(a, r) = 
o and F(b,r) = 1 for all r ,Fr(a,r) = Fr(b,r) = O. 
Thus 
b 
Er = f T(x, r) U"(x) dx 
a 
. .. .... . ... (4) 
which can be used to prove both implications in the 
theorem. To prove the righthand implication note 
that U £ 'Il implies that U"(x) ~ 0 for all x £ la, b] 
and F(x,rJ ~IF(x,rz} implies that T(y, r) ~ 0 for all 
y x [a,b]. These two together imply Er~ which by 
Equation 3a means F(x, rJ ~u F(x, r:z}. This proves 
the righthand implication of the theorem. 
To prove the reverse implication we prove that 
E ~O for all U £'Il implies that T(x,r) ~ 0 for all x £ [a~ b]. This implication is proven by contradiction. 
We assume the opposite and show that this implies 
a contradiction. Assume T(x, r) < 0 at Xl which 
since T(x, r) is continuous implies that there is some 
neighborhood of Xl such that T(x, r) < O. Let this 
neighborhood be (a?- (3) C [a, b]. Let 0 be an 
element of'll and let V"(x) be .,given by the graph in 
Figure 2. U is concave since U" (x) ~ O. for all x in 
(a, b). Since O"(x) is zero for all x not in (a, (3), 
only x's in (a, (3) are imll-octant in determining Er . 
T(x, r) is negative and V "(x) nonpositive in (a, (3) 
implying that Er is positive. This generates a 
contradiction since the original supposition was for 
Er~O ; hence, T(x, r) < 0 at Xl is impossible and 
T(x, r) ~ 0 for all x £ [a, b]. 
In this section the expected utility hypothesis 
has been selected over the mean-variance hypothe-
sis , and the method of a mean preserving spread 
has been selected as the measure of increased risk. 
Below the tools of this section, the definitions and 
the theorem , are used to analyze in the context of 
the expected utility hypothesis the effects of an 
increase in the variability of water. 
O"(X) 
Q a b x 
Figure 2. Graph of V"(X). 
A CHANGE IN THE VARIABILITY 
OF WATER CAUSED BY A 
WATER TRANSFER 
When some portion of the water in a system is 
transferred to another use and/or location the 
possibility exists that the variability of the 
remaining water will be changed. If the water 
originally came from a stream flow system and the 
water transfer is accompanied by the construction 
of a reservoir, then the variability of the remaining 
water can be expected to fall, if some portion of a 
stream flow is transferred then the variability of the 
remaining water can increase, decrease or remain 
unchanged depending upon the rules of . the 
transfer. 
A case where the variability is increased will be 
identified. Let the water supply system be a stream 
flow system with the flow (q) a random variable. 
Originally the water was divided between two sets 
of farmers, Sl and S2, with each set receiving a 
portion of the flow. Let T be the portion going to S l' 
The water supplies of S 1 and S2 were originally 
random variables given by Tq and (1-T)q, 
respectively. Let the farmers in S2 sell their water 
and let the purchasers of this water receive the 
mean amount that the S2 farmers were receiving 
but let them receive it as a constant flow. Thus the 
transfer is 
k = (1-7)q 
where k is a constant and q is the mean level of the 
stream flow. The water originally received by S 1 
was 
u = 7q 
and it is now 
v = q - (1-7) q 
where u and v are both random variables. Let G(v) 
and F(u) be the c.d.f.'s for v and u, respectively. G 
can be shown to be a mean preserving spread of F; 
thus v is more variable than u. 
Given that u and v have the same mean a 
sufficient condition for G to be a mean preserving 
spread of F is (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970) 
Set) = G(t) - F(t) ~ 0 
and 
Set) = G(t) - F(t) ~ 0 
To show that this relationship holds for G and F 
defined above, let h(q) be the density function for 
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q. The c.d.f.'s for v and u are then given by 
u 
1 v+(1-7)q f7 G(v) = h(s) ds and F(u) = h(s) ds a a 
with these definitions 
t 
t+(1-7)q T 
Set) = f h(s) ds + J h(s) ds 
a a 
which is positive for t < t* = Tq and is negative for 
t > t* = ril. To demonstrate this note that t<-rq 
and 0 < T < 1 imply 
!... < t + (1-7)q 
7 
which implies that Set) is positive. Set) negative for 
t>rq is similarly demonstrated. 
The conclusion of this section is that a transfer 
of water that has the above characteristics will 
cause the remaining water to become more variable 
in the sense of a mean preserving spread. 
THE ANALYSES OF THE EFFECTS OF 
A CHANGE IN THE VARIABILITY 
OF WATER 
In this section we examine the effects of a 
change in variability of water upon several 
important economic variables. The variability is 
assumed to increase; however, the results are 
symmetrical so that a decrease in variability will 
have the opposite results. We study the impact of 
the additional risk upon the farms in Sl' The 
variable studies are the mean level of profits and 
output, the quantity of purchased inputs, and the 
prices of water and land. 
Case I: The farmen are risk neutral 
Introduction 
In this section we examine the effects of an 
increase in risk upon the "aggregate" farm. That 
is, the set offarms in Sl is treated as a risk neutral, 
utility maximizing firm which is the same thing as a 
profit-maximizing firm. 
The "aggregate" production function is 
assumed to be real valued, concave and twice 
continuously differentiable. Let it be 
............... (1.1) 
where y is output, Xl is purchased inputs, X2 is 
water and X3 is land. We assume that the land area 
of the Sl farm is fixed so that we will be examining 
g is assumed to be strictly concave. In the analysis, 
X2 is a random variable. Let 
x
2 
= (1 + s)ZO 
where ZO is the mean quantity of water received by 
the S 1 farmers and s is a random variable on the 
interval [a, b] with a>-1 and the mean of s equal to 
zero. Let the c.d.f. for s be 
F(s ,r) = f s f(t , r) dt 
a 
where 
Fs(s, r) = f(s , r) 
is the density function for s, and r is the shift 
parameter for risk. Thus 
b 
0= f s f(s , r) ds for all r 
a 
With these suppositions the mean level of X2 is zoo 
Below some of the analyses are carried out for 
two specific production functions, the Cobb-
Douglas and CES. For Cobb-Douglas g and g are 
given, respectively, by 
and 
y = xa x(3 x 'Y 
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with a + (3 + 'Y ~ 1 and a , (3 , 'Y > 0 . (1.1a) 
y = k x~ x~ with k = x~'Y . .......... (1.2a) 
For the CES production function gand g are given, 
respectively by 
R = [0 xP + 0 xP + 0 xP ] 1 1 2 2 3 3 
with 01 +0 2 +0 3 = 1 andp< 1 .. (LIb) 
Y = [0 xP + 0 xP + C] liP 1 1 2 2 
with C = 0 xop 3 3 ...... . .. (1.2b) 
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It can be shown that Equations 1.2a and 1.2b are · 
both strictly concave in Xl and X2 so that they satisfy 
the restriction placed on Equation 1.2. If Equation 
1.1a has constant returns to scale then the limit of 
Equation LIb as p goes to zero is Equation 1. la; 
however, since we do not restrict the sum of a, (3, 
and y to equal one we do not restrict the 
Cobb-Douglas case to be a special case of the CES 
case. The relationship between p and the elasticity 
of substitution , 0 , is given by 
p = Q::l 
a 
The aggregate profit function is written as 
. . ....... (1.3) 
where p is the output price, and WI is the price of 
input Xl' The Sl farms are assumed to be price 
takers. The expected level of profits can be written 
as 
b 
E(1T) = P ~ g(x , ' (1 + s)zo) f(s , r) ds - WI XI 
........... (1.4) 
It is assumed that the farmers maximize this 
function with respect to Xl' They choose the level of 
purchased inputs (xJ that maximizes E. Note that 
in this formulation only one decision is made for Xl 
and that it is made before s is known. If s were 
known before Xl was determined, the formulation 
of the problem would be different . 
Before analyzing the effects of a change in the 
variability of water we examine some of the 
characteristics of E(n) . First, g continuous and 
bounded for all feasible Xl and ZO implies that the 
integral in Equation 1.4 exists. This integral gives 
the expected value of output, y; therefore, the 
expected value of y exists. This implies that the 
expected value of profits exists. Second, g strictly 
concave in Xl and X2 implies the E(y) is strictly 
concave in Xl and Z. This , in turn, implies the E(n) 
is strictly concave in Xl and Z. Thus the first order 
condition is both necessary and sufficient for a 
maximization of E(n). 
We now prove that g strictly concave implies 
that E(y) is strictly concave. g strictly concave in Xl 
and X2 implies 
g[tx~ + ( l -t) x:·, (1 + s) (tzO + (1 - t) Zl.)] 
. ... .. . . . .. (1.5) 
for all XIO, Xl!, ZO, Zl in the domain of g and t £ 
(0, 1). Multiplying through by f(s, r) ~ 0 and 
integrating over (a, b) with respect to s yields 
b 
f(s, r) ds > t 1 g[x~, (1 + s)zo] f(s, r) ds 
a 
b 
+ (1 - t) f g[XII , (1 + S)ZI] f(s, r) ds ... (1.6) a 
Equation 1.6 satisfies the definition of a strictly 
concave function, implying that E(y} is strictly 
concave. The profit function is easily shown to be a 
strictly concave function, and using the above 
procedure its expected value can be shown to be a 
strictly concave function. 
The effects upon the expected level of profits. 
We analyze first the effect of an increase in the 
variability of water upon the mean level of profits. 
The expected level of profits is a concave function 
of s; therefore, by Theorem 1 an increase in the 
variability of water will cause E(n} to decrease for 
each level of Xl' The level of Xl probably will not 
remain constant; however, since the entire function 
will be lower than before, the maximum level of 
expected profits will be lower. 
An alternative way of generating this informa-
tion is to differentiate the function for the solution 
level of expected profits (E(~), the bar indicates 
solution level) with respect to r. The result of this is 
b 
E/rr) = p 1 [gl (Xl' (1 +s)zo)x: f(s, r) 
a 
b 
= X~ [p f gl (Xl' (1 +s)zo)f(s, r) ds - WI] 
a 
b 
+ p f g(x 1 , (1 +s)zo)frCs, r) ds .... . . (1. 7b) a 
b 
= p fa g(x l , (1 +s)zO) fr(s,r) ds .. (1. 7c) 
f b 2 =p g 2(X ,(1 +s)zo)zo T(s,r)ds a 2 1 
. . . . . . . . . . . (1. 7d) 
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Equation 1.7b is a rearrangement of Equation 
1. 7a. The term in brackets in Equation 1. 7b is zero 
by the first order condition for an extremum (see 
below). Equation 1.7d is derived from Equation 
1.7c by twice integrating by parts. In the equation 
T(s, r) is the function defined in Equation 2a, and 
is nonnegative. The production function is strictly 
concave implying that gzz is negative; therefore, 
Equation 1. 7d is negative as indicated above. 
The effects upon Xl' Now we analyze the effect 
of an increase in the variability of water upon the 
purchased input. This effect is analyzed using the 
first order condition for a maximization of 
Equation 1.4. This first order condition is 
b 
aE =p J g (x ,(l+s)zo)f(s,r)ds-w
1 
=0 
ax a ll 
1 
.......... (1.8) 
or 
. ............... (1.8a) 
This condition says that at equilibrium the 
mean level of the value of the marginal product is 
equal to the input price. An increase in r will cause 
E(gJ to fall if gl(XI, (1 + s)zO> is concave in s. This 
conclusion is derived by applying Theorem 1. If 
gl(XI, (1 + s)zO) is convex in s then E(gJ will rise as 
r increases. If gl is neither concave nor convex then 
there is insufficient information to determine the 
change in E(gl}' The effect on Xl can be determined 
with the aid of Figure 3. Let the price of Xl be WIO 
and gl be concave in s. The curve labeled pE°(gJ is 
for r = rO and the one labeled pEI(gJ is for r = rl 
with rl > rD. Thus as r increases from rO to rl E(gJ 
decreases at each Xl causing the solution Xl to 
decrease; consequently aXil ar = xr l < 0 for gl 
Figure 3. The effect of an Increase In risk for Ih 
concave In I • 
concave in s. For gl convex in s the conclusion is the 
opposite. 
These same conclusions can be generated by 
differentiating the first order conditions with 
respect to r and solving for xr 1. This yields 
b f gIl (Xl ' (1 +s)zo f(s, r) ds 
a 
. . (1. 9) 
The denominator is negative since g11 is negative 
everywhere in the domain of g. Thus xr l has the 
same sign as the numerator. Twice integrating the 
numerator by parts yields 
b 
N = f g221 (Xl ' (1+s)ZO)Z02 T(s, r) ds .(1.10) 
a 
where T(s, r) is the function defined in Equation 
2a). Since T(s, r) ~ 0 for all s£[a, b] and the square 
of zO(z02) is positive, the sign of g221 determines the 
sign ofN. If gl is concave in X2 then g221 ~ 0 for all 
sda, b] and N ~ 0 which yields 
and if gl is convex in X2 then g221 ~ 0 and N ~ 0 
implying that 
In general xr 1 can be either negative ' or 
positive; however, if the production function is 
Cobb-Douglas or CES then xrl is restricted. For the 
Cobb-Douglas production function g221 is negative 
implying that xr l is negative. Differentiating 
Equation lola yields 
g221 =a{3(f3-1)X~-1 X~-2 xI .... ...... (1.11) 
All of the terms in g221 are positive except {3 - 1, 
which is negative because of the restrictions given 
with Equation lola. 
For the CES production function g221 can be 
either 'positive or negative; however with restric-
tions that appear to be reasonable for water, g221 
. will be negative making xr l negative. Differentiat-
ing Equation 1.1 b yields 
g - s:: s:: (1 ) P- I P-2 R(lIP )-2 
. 221 - vI v 2 -P Xl X2 
(Eyx (1-2p) + p-1) 
2 
... . .... (1.12) 
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where 
EYX2 is the elasticity of production with respect to 
X2' All terms in Equation 1.12 except the last 
parenthetical expression are positive; therefore that 
last expression determines the sign of g221 . 
Examine the parenthetical expression. Let 
A = ¢ (1-2p ) + p-1 where ¢ = E • (1.13) YX2 
First note that CES is homogeneous of degree 1 in 
Xl, x2, and X3 implying 
1 = E YX
I 
+ E YX2 + EYX3 
thus we seek the characteristics of A for 
0< ¢ <1 
and 
p<1 
Manipulations of Equation 1.13 show that A > 0 if 
and only if 
a) for 0 < ¢ < l 
2 
b) and for l < ¢ < 1 
2 
p < -...!± <0 
1-2 ¢ 
Condition a) fails since it implies that e is greater 
than 1; therefore condition b) is the necessary and 
sufficient condition for A to be positive. In b) EYX2 
is greater than one-half and p is negative. The 
condition p is negative is equivalent to the 
condition that the elasticity of substitution is less 
than one. Thus if either of these fail A, g221 and xr l 
are all negative. If both of these hold, then 
condition b) holds and xr l will be positive. This is 
summarized in Table 2. 
If a market for water exists and the farmers in 
SI are price takers, then the price of water will be 
equal to the average level of the value of the 
Table 2. The sign of Ir 1 for the CES production 
O<p<1 
p<O 
function. 
O<¢<~ ~<¢<1 
marginal product of water. Evaluating this at its 
mean we have 
The term W2X2 is the expenditure on water and py is 
total revenues. Thus £YX2 is equal to waters share of 
total receipts. The available evidence indicates that 
this share is less than one half implying that if the 
production function is CES it is reasonable to 
expect xr 1 to be negative. 
The effect upon the mean level of output. The 
question of whether the farmers increase or 
decrease production when water becomes more 
variable is analyzed next. The equation for the 
mean level of production is 
b 
E(y) = f g(xl , (1 +s)zo) f(s , r) ds ... (1.14) a 
If Xl is treated as the solution level for the 
maximization of Equation 1.4, then Equation 1.14 
gives the expected level of the solution level of 
output. Differentiating this solution level with 
respect to r yields 
b 
= x~ f gl (Xl' (l+s)zO) f(s,r) ds 
a 
b 
+ f g(x 1 , (1+s)zo) f/s,r)ds .. (1.15) a 
Using Equation 1. 7c the second righthand term 
can be shown to be negative. The integral in the 
first righthand term is positive since the marginal 
physical product is positive; thus this term has the 
same sign as xr 1. If xr 1 is negative, then Er (J) is 
negative; however if xr1 is positive then ErG> is 
indeterminant. ErG> will be negative if the 
production function is Cobb-Douglas and if the 
prod uction function is CES the sufficient condi-
tions for ErG> to be negative are the same as those 
for xr 1 and they are summarized in Table 2. 
The effects upon the prices of water and land. 
We now analyze the effect of an increase in the 
variability of water upon the combined return to 
water and land and the return to each individually. 
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An increase in r will cause the combined yield to 
fall assuming that i is homogeneous of degree 1 in 
all three inputs. The effect upon the return to water 
or the price of water is in general indeterminant; 
however, if i is Cobb-Douglas or CES with the 
elasticity of substitution greater than one (0)1), 
then the price will fall. The effect upon the price of 
land is also in general indeterminant; however, if 
the production function is Cobb-Douglas or CES 
with the elasticity of production with respect to 
water less than one-half, then the effect is negative. 
If the individual farmers in SI are price takers, 
then the input prices will be equal to the expected 
value of the marginal product. With i homogene-
ous of degree 1 the term profits used above is 
nothing more than the combined return to water 
and land, and expected profits the expected 
combined return. Since an increase in r causes 
expected profits to fall, it will cause the expected 
combined return to fall. 
The effect of r upon the return to water can be 
analyzed by examining the expected value of the 
marginal product of water. This mean value is 
given by 
b 
E(VMPz) = p fa gz(x l , (l+s)zO f(s, r)ds 
......... (1.16) 
Differentiate Equation 1.16 with respect to r while 
treating Xl as the solution level from the 
maximization of Equation 1.4. The result of this is 
b 
+ fa gz{xJI +s )zo) fr{ s,r )d~ . (1.17) 
In general the sign of the first term in braces is 
indeterminant. The integral can have either sign 
since the cross partial derivative glz can have either 
sign and as identified above so can xr 1 have either 
sign. The sign of the second integral is also 
indeterminant in general since it depends upon the 
concavity or convexity of gz. Thus in general there 
is not much that can be said about the sign of 
Equation 1.17. However if i is Cobb-Douglas the 
1 
"I 
sign is negative and if 'g is CES a sufficient 
condition for Equation 1.17 to be negative is the 
elasticity of substitution greater than on (0)1). 
For the Cobb-Douglas production function xrl 
is negative and glz is positive. The first term in 
braces is, therefore, negative. Twice integrating by 
parts the second term in braces yields 
b 
B = f gssz (Xl ,(1 +s)zO) T(s, r)ds .... (1.18) 
a 
the term T(s,r) is defmed in Equation 2a and is 
nonnegative; therefore, the sign of B depends upon 
the sign of gssz' Differentiation of Equation 1.1a 
yields 
gssz = {32 ({3-1 )x~ (1 +s ){3-2 z{3-1 x~'Y .... (1.19) 
All terms in Equation 1.19 are positive except 
((J-1); thus gssz is negative for Cobb-Douglas 
implying that B is negative. The term in braces in 
Equation 1.17 is negative and p is positive; 
therefore Equation 1.17 is negative for the 
Cobb-Douglas production function. 
For the CES production function the sign of 
xr
l is determined by condition b) given above. The 
cross partial derivative glZ is positive implying that 
condition b) which is summarized in Table 2 
determines the sign of the first term in braces in 
Equation 1.17. To examine the second term using 
Equation 1.18 differentiate Equation 1.1 b. The 
result is 
g = ° zrr l R(l Ip)-l (1+s)P-2 (I-p)(o (l+s)z]P ssz 2 2 
R-I_l) (02 [(l+s)Z]PR-I(l-2p)+p) 
= 02ZP-I R(l/p)-l (1+sf-2 (l-p)(€yx
2 
-I) 
(€yx (l-2p) +p) 
2 
............ (1.20) 
All terms in Equation 1.20 are positive except the 
last two parenthetical expressions. The . term 
(£YX2-1) is negative and the last term can be either 
positive or negative. To examine the last term let 
c = ¢(1-2p) +p where ¢ = €yx
2 
••• (1.21) 
Manipulations of Equation 1.21 for 0<<1><1 and 
p<l yield C<O if and only if 
c) for 0 < ¢ < 1/2 p<~<O 
2¢-1 
d) and for 1/2 <¢ < 1 p>~ >0 
2¢-1 
Condition d) fails since it implies that p is greater 
than 1; therefore condition c) is the necessary and 
. sufficient condition for C to be negative. In 
condition c) p is negative (0<1) and £YX2 is less than 
one-half. When both of these conditions hold C is 
negative and gssz is positive. When either one of 
these conditions fails C is positive and gssz is 
negative. Table 3 summarizes these conclusions. 
Return now to the examination of the sign of 
Er(VMPz) in Equation 1.17. The second term in 
braces which is called B in Equation 1.18 has the 
sign of gssz' This sign is given in Table 3. The first 
term in braces has the sign of xr I and its sign is 
given in Table 2. An examination of these two 
tables yields p greater than zero (0)1) as a 
sufficient condition for Er (VMP z) to be negative. 
For other conditions the sign is indeterminant. 
The effect of r upon the return to land can be 
analyzed by examining the expected value of the 
marginal product ofland. This mean value is given 
by 
............. (1.22) 
Treat Xl as the optimum Xl and differentiate 
Equation 1.22 with respect to r. The result is 
b 
Er(VMP \ ) = p fa [x: g: 3 f(s, r) + ~ frCs, r)] ds 
f(s , r) ds + 
..... ... . . ... (1.23) 
Table 3. The sign of Issz for CES production 
function. 
O<p<1 gssz < 0 
p<O 
l<¢<l 
2 
gssz < 0 
gssz < 0 
In general the sign of Equation 1.23 is indetermin-
ant. As with Equation 1.17 the signs of both terms 
in braces are indeterminant in general. However, if 
-g is Cobb-Douglas or CE5 with the elasticity of 
production with respect to X2 less than one-half 
then the sign is negative. 
If the production function is Cobb-Douglas 
the first term in braces is negative. The cross 
partial derivative g13 is positive and xr 1 is negative. 
The second term in braces is also negative. To 
prove this integrate the term twice by parts. The 
result is 
D= 
... . . . ........... (1.25) 
The sign of this integral depends upon g223. 
Differentiating Equation 1.1 a yields 
which is negative for the restrictions given with 
Equation 1.1a; consequently, both terms in braces 
in Equation 1.23 are negative. Er(VMPl) is, 
therefore, negative since p is positive. 
If the production function is CE5 the first 
integral in Equation 1.23 is positive so the sign of 
the first term in braces depends upon the sign of 
xr
l
. Information about that sign is summarized in 
Table 2. Now examine using Equation 1.25 the sign 
of the second term in braces. The sign of this term 
is determined by -g-223. This derivative is 
g223 = 0 0 (l-p) X P-l xP-2 R(lIP)-2 
2 3 3 2 
(€ (l-2p)+p-l) YX2 .......... (1.26) 
The last term of Equation 1.26 determines the sign 
of ~23 since the other terms are positive. The last 
term is equal to A given in Equation 1.13. Above 
the sign of A determined the sign of xr l . Here the 
sign of A determines the sign of D in Equation 1.25 
and, therefore determines the sign of the second 
term in Equat ion 1.23. Thus A determines the sign 
of both terms in Equation 1.23. Consequently the 
sign of Er (VMP l) and the sign of xr 1 agree so that 
Table 2 summarizes information about the sign of 
both. As argued above it is reasonable to expect 
(YX2 to be less than one-half; thus, it is reasonable 
to expect Er (VMPx~ to be negative. 
Summary of Case I. In this section we have 
analyzed the effect of an increase in risk upon 
several important variables. The results for the 
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general case were mostly indeterminant. That is, if 
the only restriction that we place on the production 
function is that it be strictly concave then the effect 
upon only one variable is determinant. Fortunately, 
it is the effect upon the most important variable 
that is determinant. An increase in risk will cause 
expected profits to fall. Thus an increase in risk 
will harm the farmers. If the production function is 
Cobb-Douglas then the effect on each of the 
variables examined is determinant. In each case 
the effect is negative. If the production function is 
CE5 then the effects are determinant for certain 
values of the parameters of the function. 
The results of this section are summarized in 
Table 4. In the table a minus sign indicates that the 
sign of the partial derivative is negative. An I 
indicates that the sign is indeterminant, and a 
conditional statement with a sign indicates a 
sufficient condition for the sign to hold. 
Case D: The farmers are risk averse 
In this section the set of farms in 51 is treated 
as a risk averse, utility maximizing entity. It is 
assumed that there exists an "aggregate" 
production function that relates inputs to output 
for the 51 set. The utility function which is 
maximized is strictly concave since the group is 
assumed to be risk averse. As above, when the 
conclusions are indeterminant for the general case 
the Cobb-Douglas and CE5 production functions 
are analyzed to determine if answers exist for these 
special cases. At some points in this section a 
specific utility function is assumed. The utility 
function has the property of constant risk aversion. 
The first problem analyzed in this section is 
the effect of changing the assumption of risk 
Table 4. Summary of the effects. 
Variable 
E/y) 
Er(VMPz) 
Er (VMP3 ) 
Production Function 
Concave Cobb-Douglas 
a) 0 <€ < ~ YX 2 
b)O<p<l 
CES 
+ if c 
-ifaorb 
+ if c 
- if a or b 
- if b 
- if a or b 
+ifc 
neutrality to one of risk aversion. The other 
problem analyzed is that of an increase in the 
variability of water (risk). The impacts of these 
changes upon profits, output, quantity demanded 
of the purchased input, and the prices of land and 
water are all analyzed. The impacts of both the 
change from risk neutrality to risk aversion and for 
an increase in the degree of risk aversion are 
analyzed. In the latter of these the utility function 
is assumed to exhibit constant risk aversion. This 
utility function is also used in parts of the analysis 
of an increase in the variability of water. 
Some preliminaries 
It is assumed that the utility function, 
U = U(7T) ..................... (2.1) 
is strictly monotone increasing, strictly concave, 
. and thrice continuously differentiable. The utility 
function that exhibits constant risk aversion will 
have the property 
8=-~ U (7T) .................. (2.2) 
where 8 is the "degree of risk aversion" and is a 
positive constant. This measure of risk aversion 
was suggested independently by Pratt (1964) and 
by Arrow (1963). Equation 2.2 is a second order 
homogeneous linear differential equation which 
has the general solution 
The proof that Equation 2.S is strictly concave 
in x is as follows. 
U(n) strictly concave means 
U((1-t)n° + t7T» (l-t) U(7TO) + t U(7T) . ... (2.6) 
for all nO, n in the domain of U and all 0<t<1. 
n(x, p, w) concave in x means 
A ° 7T (x,p,w) ~ (1-t) 7T (x ,p,w) + t 7T(X,p,W) 
x = (1-t)xo + tx ................ (2.7) 
for all xO, x in the domain of g(x) and O~ t ~1. U (n) 
a strictly monotone increasing function means 
. .................. (2.8) 
for n2 > nl. Combining Equations 2.7 and 2.8 yields 
U(1T()2,p,W)) ~ U((1-t)1T(XO,p,w) + t 7T(X,p,W)) 
........... (2.9) 
Letting nO = n(xO, p, w) and n = n(x, p, w) and 
combining Equations 2.6 and 2.9 yields 
U(7T(~p,W))~ U((1-t)7TO + t1T) 
.................. (2.3) or 
where ~ and I/J are arbitrary constants of U(7T(£p ,W)) > (1-t) U(7T(XO ,p,w)) + t U(7T(X,p,W)) 
integration. I/J is positive since U(n) is assumed to 
be strictly monotone increasing, and ~ is also .......... (2.10) 
positive since U(n) is assumed to be positive. The 
magnitudes of ~ and I/J, however, do not affect the which means that U is strictly concave in x. 
expected utility maximization solutions; hence 
their magnitudes are unimportant. Define 
Let profits be given by x
2 
= (1 +s )z 
7T = 1T(X,p,W) = pg(x) - w'x ........... (2.4) 
where x is a vector of inputs, w is a vector of input 
prices; g is the production function and p is the 
output price. Given that g(x) is concave and that p 
is positive, then n(x, p, w) is concave in x. This 
follows from n being a positive linear combination 
of concave functions. Combining Equations 2.1 
and 2.4 yields 
·U = U(7T(X,p,W)) ................. (2.S) 
which is strictly concave in x. 
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and 
b 
E(U) = J U(7T(X1 , (1 +s)z,p,w) f(s ,r)ds a 
where Xl and X2 are the only variable inputs. The 
fact that U is strictly concave in x implies that E(U) 
is also strictly concave in x. The proof of this is as 
follows. U strictly concave in x implies 
U(7TeXl ' (1 +s)Z',p,w)) > (1-t)U(1T(X~,(1 +s)zo ,p,w)) 
+ t U(7T(X1 ,(1 +s)z,p,w)) 
where 
2 = (l-t)xo + tx I I I 
'2'= (l-t)zO + tz 
for all XIO, Xl' ZO, z, and s in the domain of nand 
O<t<1. Multiplying through by f(s,r) ~ 0 and 
integrating over [a, b] with respect to s yields 
fb U(1T(XI ' (1 +s),Z',p,w)) f(s ,r)ds > (1-t) 
a 
b f U(1T(XO, (l+s)zo,p,w)) f(s,r)ds a I 
b 
+ tf U(1T(X
1
, (l+s)z,p ,w)) f(s ,r)ds ... (2.11) 
a 
thus E(U(n» is strictly concave in Xl and Z.2 
The utility functions that will be examined in 
this section are strictly concave; thus the first order -
condition for a maximization of expected utility 
will be both necessary and sufficient for a 
maximum, since E(U(n» is strictly concave in the 
inputs. 
The effects of risk avenlon 
We now examine the effect of changing the 
assumption of risk neutrality to risk aversion. We 
analyze the effects upon expected profits first then 
upon the quantity of the purchased input, the 
expected level of output, and last upon the prices of 
water and land. These analyses as those presented 
above assume that land and the mean quantity of 
water are constant. . 
The effect upon the expected level of profits. 
Given that a risk averse set of Sl farmers uses a 
different quantity of the purchased input than a 
risk indifferent set, the expected level of profits will 
be lower for the risk averse set than for the risk 
indifferent set. This follows from the fact that the 
risk indifferent set will maximize expected profits; 
thus any movement away from their solution will 
lower profits. 
The effects upon Xl and upon the expected 
level of output. We examine now the effect upon 
the quantity of the purchased input and upon the 
exp~ted level of output. The quantity of the 
purchased input can be either larger or smaller for 
28, IDee Xl can be t reated as a vector, this proof holds for any 
number of nonrandom variables. 
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the risk averse set than for the risk neutral set 
depending upon the sign of the second partial 
derivative g21' If g21 is positive (negative), then the 
risk averse set uses less (more) Xl than does the risk 
neutral set. The Cobb-Douglas and CES produc-
tion functions, Equations 1.1a and 1.1b have g21 
positive; thus if either of these production functions 
hold, the change of assumption will lower the 
quantity of the purchased input, Xl' The expected 
level of output will increase when Xl does and 
decrease when Xl does, since gl is positive. Thus if 
g21 is positive (negative) then the expected level of 
output will be less (more) for the risk averse set 
than for the risk neutral set. 
We now prove these conclusions. The function 
to be maximized is the expected utility function 
b 
E(U) = J U(pg(xl , (1 +s)zo) - WI Xl) f(s,r)ds a 
............ (2.12) 
the first order condition for a maximum of E(U) is 
or 
or 
or 
aE(U) = f b U'(1T) (pg (x ,(1 +s)zo)-w ) 
ax a I I I 
I 
f(s ,r)ds = 0 . ........... (2.13) 
E[U'(1T)' (pgI -WI)] = pE[U'(1T)gI] 
-WI E[U'(1T)] = 0 
p (E [U'(1T)] E [gl] + cov [U'(1T ) ,gI]) 
= WI E [U'(1T)] 
p E [gl] = WI - p(COV [U'(1T),gI]) / E [U'(1T)] 
. ........... (2.13a) 
In this last expression U'(n) is positive; thus 
E[U'(n)] is positive. The sign of the last term, 
therefore, depends upon the sign of the covariance 
between U'(n) and gl(1 . + s)zll). For the risk 
neutral set U'(n) is a constant and the covariance is 
zero. For this case Equation 2.13a becomes 
Equation 1.8a as stated earlier. That is, the 
maximization of expected profits is the same thing 
as the maximization expected utility if the utility 
function exhibits risk neutrality. A sufficient 
condition for the cov[U'(n), gJ to be positive 
(negative) is for Us' and gSl to have the same sign 
(opposite signs) where -
v' = aV'{7T) = V"{7T )p~ ZO 
S as 
and 
The utility function is strictly concave, implying 
that U"(n) ~ O. This means that Us' ~ 0 for all s £ 
[a, b]. If gZl is positive as in Cobb-Douglas and 
CES then the two have opposite signs and the 
convariance is negative. If gZl is negative then the 
two terms have the same sign and the covariance is 
positive. Thus with gu negative and gZl positive 
(negative) the solution Xl for the risk averse set is 
less (greater) than the solution Xl for the risk 
neutral set. With gZl positive (negative) pE[gJ> WI 
«WI) which implies a smaller (larger) quantity of 
Xl than does pE[gJ = WI which is the risk netural 
solution. 
The effect upon the price of water. We now 
examine the effect of risk aversion upon the price of 
water. Here we assume as we did above that the 
mean quantity of water is constant, zo, and 
examine the effects of risk aversion upon the price 
of water. It is assumed that competition among the 
Sl farmers for the water competes the price of 
water, wz' to a level such that 
or 
or 
f b U'(tr)(pgz - w
z
) f(s,r)ds = 0 
a . 
w = Z 
pE [V'{7T )gz] 
E [U'{7T)] 
..... (2.14) 
Wz = pE[gzl + p{cOV[V'{7T), gz]) / E[V'{7T)] 
.......... (2. 14a) 
That is, the mean quantity of water is fixed and the 
farmers in Sl compete for that quantity till the 
price of the water just satisfies the first order 
condition for water. If the set is risk neutral then 
U' is a constant and the covariance is zero. This 
implies that Wz is equal to the expected value of the 
value of the marginal product of water which was 
discussed in Case I. The term E [gz] will be smaller 
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for risk aversion than for risk neutrality. The 
reason for this is the change in Xl. The Xl in risk 
aversion is smaller (larger) than the one in risk 
neutrality if gZl is positive (negative) implying that 
gz = gz (1 +s) is lower at each s causing E[gz] to be 
lower under risk aversion than risk neutrality. If 
the second righthand term is negative then Wz is 
lower for risk aversion; however, if that term is 
positive, the effect of risk aversion is indetermin-
ant. The effect of the two terms is opposite in sign 
for this case. The second righthand term has the 
same sign as the covariance term, and the 
covariance is negative if Us' and gsz have opposite 
signs. As noted above Us' is negative; therefore the 
sign of the covariance is determined by gsz. If gsz is 
positive then the covariance is negative and Wz is 
lower for risk aversion than risk neutrality. 
If the production function is Cobb-Douglas as 
given by Equation l.la then gsz is positive and Wz 
is lower for risk aversion than for risk neutrality. 
This derivative is given by 
a = p2 xa (I +s)~- 1 z~- 1 xa 
bSZ ~ 1 3 ....... (2.15) 
which is clearly positive. However, if the produc-· 
tion function is CES as given by Equation l.lb then 
gsz can be either positive or negative. This 
derivative is given by 
gsz = (\ R lIP-l zP-l{l +s1- 1 [{l-p) €yx + p] . (2.1Sa) 
• 2 
The sign of the term in brackets determines the 
sign of gsz since the rest of the expression is 
positive. The bracketed term is positive for e > 0 
(0)1) and is negative for some combinations of e 
and £YXz for p<O (0<1). For p,<O and£yxz >0 the 
bracket term is negative if 
0<1 - €yx < 1 
2 
and is positive if 
a> 1 - €yx
2 
where 0 is the elasticity of substitution and is given 
by 
0= _1_ 
I-p 
Therefore if the elasticity of substitution is 
sufficiently large the price of water will be lower for 
risk aversion than for risk neutrality. And if the 
elasticity of substitution is sufficiently small then 
the direction of the effect is indeterminant. 
The effect upon the price of land. Next we 
examine the price of land. We assume that 
competition among the Sl farmers for the fIXed 
quantity of land will compete the price of land, W3, 
to a level such that 
or 
or 
J b U'(1T )(p~ -w 3) f(s,r )ds = 0 
a 
w = pE [UI(1T)~ ] 
3 E [U'(1T)] 
.. .. . (2.16) 
w3pE[~] +p(COV[U ' (1T ),~]) / E[U'(1T)] 
........ (2.16a) 
As above the risk neutral solution is where W3 = 
pE[g:J or the price of land is equal to the mean 
value of the value of the marginal product of land. 
The first righthand term will be larger for risk 
aversion than risk neutrality if g12 and g13 agree in 
sign and smaller if they disagree in sign. If g12 is 
positive (negative) then Xl is smaller (larger) under 
risk aversion and g13 positive (negative) implies that 
g3 is smaller at each s. These imply that E[g:J is 
lower for risk aversion than for risk neutrality. The 
same steps yield for a disagreement in signs E[g3] 
larger for risk aversion. 
The sign of the second term agrees with the 
sign of the covariance term. The covariance term is 
negative (positive) if Us' and gS3 disagree (agree) in 
sign . Since Us' is negative, the second term will be 
negative (positive) if gS3 is positive (negative). 
Combining the results we have W3 lower for risk 
aversion if E[g3] is lower for risk aversion and the 
covariance is negative. These conditions will exist if 
g12 and g13 agree in sign· and if gS3 = g2]Z is 
positive. If the production function is Cobb-
Douglas or CES then g12, g13 and g23 are all 
positive, implying that W3 is lower for risk aversion 
than for risk neutrality. If E[g:J is higher for risk 
aversion and the covariance is negative then w 3 will 
be higher for risk aversion than risk neutrality. 
This result will hold if g12 and g13 disagree in sign 
while g23 is negative. 
The effects of an increase 
in risk aversion 
Introduction. Here we analyze the effects of an 
increase in risk aversion. To do this we assume that 
the utility function exhibits constant risk aversion 
and differentiate different functions with respect to 
the "degree of risk aversion. " The utility function 
is by Equation 2.3 
............... . ... (2.3) 
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where () is the "degree of risk aversion." 
With this utility function expected utility is 
given by 
b 
E(U) = J (~ - lj;e -(}1T) f(s ,r)ds 
a 
.... (2.17) 
where 
and the first order condition for a maximum of 
expected utility is given by 
f(s ,r)ds = 0 .... . .. . .. (2.18) 
Before proceeding to the individual analyses 
we note an important characteristic of these 
results. In the limit as () . goes to zero, the solution 
level of Xl goes to the risk indifferent or expected 
profit maximization solution. The solution level of 
Xl is defined by Equation 2.18, and the limit of 
Equation 2.18 as (} goes to zero is 
b f (pgI (Xl ,(1 +s)zO) - WI) f(s,r)ds = 0 . (2. 18a) 
a 
which is first order condition for the risk neutral 
case Equation 1.8. Thus in the limit (} goes to zero 
the solution Xl goes to the solution that was 
analyzed in the risk neutral section. An additional 
important point is that the functional relationship 
between Xl and (} is continuous given the continuity 
assumptions that were made for U and g. 
The effect upon II. We examine first the effect 
of an increase in risk aversion «(}) upon Xl then 
upon expected profits, expected output, and the 
prices of land and water. To examine the effect 
upon Xl we differentiate the first order condition 
with respect to (} and then evaluate the results. The 
result of this differentiation is 
......... .. ...... (2.19) 
where 
........... (2.20) 
Since g is convex, gu ~ 0 and D is negative; 
therefore the sign of x () 1 is the oppositve of that of 
N. Below it is proven that if g21 is positive (negative) 
then x() 1 is negative (positive). For some produc-
tion functions the use of the purchased input will 
increase as risk aversion increases and for others it 
will decrease. If the production function is either 
Cobb-Douglas or CES then g21 will be positive and 
x() 1 will be negative. 
We now prove that g21 > 0 «0) implies that 
N>O «0) which implies that x () 1 <0 (>0). In the 
proof we use the following definitions: 
1) x~ is the solution to Equation 2.l8 
3) 1To(S) = pg(x~ , (1 +s)Zo) - W 1 x~ 
4) 1TO(SO) = pg(x~ ,(1 +so) - W 1 x~ 
Evaluate N at Xl0. Multiply the first order condition 
by no(s"} 
and subtract the result from N. This yields 
f(s,r)ds 
SO 
N = fa (pg~ (s)-w
1
) [1To(S)-1To(sO)]e-()1To(S) 
b 
f(s,r)ds + 1.0 (pg~(s)-w 1 ) [1TO(S) -1TO(SO)] 
e-()1To(S) f(s,r)ds ........... (2.21) 
Examine the first integral in Equation 2.21. The 
bracketed term is negative for all s<S° since it is 
zero at SO and 
If g21> 0 «0) then the parenthetical expression is 
negative (positive) for all s<s°. The other two terms 
are positive, i.e., 
therefore the first integral is positive (negative) if 
g21>O «0). The second integral is examined in like 
fashion. The bracketed term is positive for all s>S° 
since it is zero at SO and no'(s) >0. The parenthetical 
expression is positive (negative) if g21 >0 «0). 
Since the two integrals agree in sign and their signs 
are as stated in the original statement, the proof is 
complete. 
The effect upon E(n). We now examine the 
effect of an increase in risk aversion upon the 
expected level of profits. The expected level of 
profits is given by 
E(1T) = Jb [pg(x l ,(1+s)zO)-W1 X 1 ] f(s ,r)ds a 
............ (2.22) 
This equation gives the solution level of expected 
profits if Xl is treated as the solution Xl. 
Differentiating Equation 2.22 with respect to (J 
treating Xl as a function of () yields 
b 
E(J(iT) = Xl f (pgl -w) f(s,r)ds .... .. (2.23) () a 
It was demonstrated above in connection with 
Equation 2.13a that the integral in Equation 2.23 
is positive (negative) if g21 is positive (negative). x() 1 
is negative (positive) if g21 is positive (negative); thus 
the two terms in Equa!:ion 2.23 are opposite in sign. 
This implies that E()(n) is negative. The more risk 
averse the set of Sl farmers is, the lower will be the 
solution average level of profits. 
The effect upon E(j). The solution expected 
level of output will increase or decrease depending 
upon what happens to Xl. If Xl increases (decreases) 
as risk aversion increases then so will the solution 
expected level of output. This is proven as follows. 
The expected level of output is given by 
b 
E(y) = f g(x l ,(1 +s)zo) f(s ,r)ds a .... (2.24) 
Differentiating Equation 2.24 with respect to (), 
treating Xl as a function of () yields 
b 
E [y] = Xl f gl (Xl' (1 +s)zo) f(s ,r)ds () () a 
........ . .. (2.25) 
Thus the sign of E() (J) is the same as that of x ()1 
since the integral in Equation 2.25 is positive. 
The effect upon wz. The analysis of the change 
in the price of water is similar to that of the last 
section. Again we assume that the 51 farmers 
compete the price of water to a level such that 
Equation 2.14 holds, or in terms of the current 
utility function 
b f (pg -w )e-()n f(s ,r)ds = Q a z z ...... . (2.26) 
That is , W z is defined by Equation 2.26. To 
determine the effect of an increase in risk aversion 
differentiate Equation 2.26 with respect to () . This 
differentiation yields 
b f (pg -w ) e-(}n [n+()xl (Pgl -w )] a z z () 1 
b f(s ,r)d~ / f. e-()n f(s ,r)ds .. (2.27) 
The denominator is positive, thus, the sign of 
Equation 2.27 is determined by the term in braces. 
The sign of the term in braces is in general 
indeterminant; however, its sign can be determined 
for () " close" to zero for certain cases by letting () 
go to .zero in the limit. The limit ofw() z as () goes to 
zero IS 
b 
limit we = f pgl Z f(s,r)ds . limit xe 
a ()4 Q ()4Q 
... (2.28) 
The first term in this limit is negative. The integral 
in this term is positive (negative) if g21 is positive 
(negative) and limit of X() 1 as 8 goes to zero is finite 
a d is negative (positive) if g21 is positive (negative). 
Thus the two signs are opposite and the term is 
negative. 
The second righthand term can be written 
b b 
-(fa (pgz-Wz) f(s,r)ds . fa nf(s,r)ds 
+ cov [pgz, n] ) ............. (2.29) 
The first term in this expression is zero since the 
first integral is the limit of Equation 2.26 as 8 goes 
to zero. This integral is, therefore, equal to zero. 
The sign of the covariance term is positive 
(negative) if TIs and gsz agree (disagree) in sign. TIs 
= pg2z is positive, and gsz can be either positive or 
negative. Combining these ideas we get Equation 
2.28 negative if gsz is positive and indeterminant if 
gsz is negative since in this case the two terms 
would have opposite signs . If the production 
function is Cobb-Douglas then gsz is positive (see 
the discussion related to Equation 2.15) or if the 
prod uction function is CE5 with 
a> 1- €yx
2 
. ............ (2.30) 
where a ~s. the elasticity. of su~stitution and £YX2 is 
the ~lasttclty of productIOn WIth respect to X2 then 
gsz is positive (see the discussion related to 
Equation 2.16). 5ince the functions are continuous 
in 8 there exists an interval about zero for which 
the conclusions derived from Equation 2.28 hold; 
therefore for 0 "small" and gsz positive, W 8 z is 
negative. 
The effect upon W3' The analysis of the effect 
of a change in risk aversion on the price of land is 
similar to that just presented for the price of water. 
We assume that competition among the 51 farmers 
for the fixed quantity ofland will compete the price 
of land, W3, to a level such that Equation 2.16 
holds, or using the current utility function that 
b f (pg3 -w 3)e-8rr f(s ,r)ds = 0 
a 
....... (2.31) 
Differentiating Equation 2.31 with respect to 8, 
treating Xl as a function of 8 yields 
b 
-f (p~ -w3 ) (rrt6 xe pgl) a 
b 
f(s ,r)ds) / fa e- 8n f(s,r)ds . . (2.32) 
As in the previous case we take . the limit as 8 goes 
to zero. This limit is 
b 
limit we = f pg 13 f(s,r) ds 
a (]-+O 
b f (pg3-W )7Tf(s,r)ds .. (2.33) 
a 
The first term is positive if g13 and g12 disagree in 
sign since both the integral and the limit will have 
the same sign. These two parts of the first term will 
disagree in sign if g13 and g12 agree in sign. This will 
cause the first term to be negative. The second term 
can be written as 
+ cov [pg3 ' 7T] 
The first term of this expression is zero since it is 
the limit of Equation 2.31 as (] goes to zero. The 
covariance is positive (negative) if gS3 = g2]Z is 
positive (negative) since 1ts is positive. Collecting 
these pieces of information we have for (] "close" to 
zero w (] 3 negative if g 13 and g 12 agree in sign and g23 
is positive, and w (] 3 will be positive if g13 and g12 
disagree in sign and g23 is negative. If the 
production function is Cobb-Douglas or CES then 
g13' g12, and g23 will all be positive and the 
sufficient conditions for w (] 3 to be negative will be 
satisfied. 
The effects of an increase in risk 
In this section we analyze the effects of an 
increase in risk upon the expected level of real 
income (utility), the expected level of money 
income (profits), the quantity of the purchased 
input, the expected level of output, and the prices 
of water and land. 
The effect upon real income. The effect of an 
increase in risk upon the expected level of real 
income (utility) is tautological. The utility function 
is concave; therefore, a change in risk is an increase 
if, and only if, the expected level of utility falls. 
That is, by definition an increase in risk makes a 
risk averter worse off. These statements hold the 
quantities of the inputs constant; however, if the 
inputs are variable the statement still holds. This 
follows since the entire expected utility function is 
shifted down; thus the maximum level of expected 
utility must shift down as risk increases. 
The effect upon Xl' We examine now the effect 
of an increase in risk upon the quantity of the 
purchased input. This effect is examined by 
examining the derivative of Xl with respect to r. 
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This derivative is derived by differentiating the first 
order condition Equation 2.13 with respect to r. 
This derivative is 
aX I 
Tr= x~ = -~ ............... (2.34) 
where 
b 
D = f [U"(7T)(pgl-WI )2 + U'(7T) pgll] f(s,r)ds a 
D is negative for U and g concave; thus the sign of 
Xrl agrees with the sign of N. N is negative 
(positive) if the product U'(n) (pgl-WJ is concave 
(convex) in s. In general the conditions specified for 
U and g do not imply that this product is either 
concave or convex. The sign of xr l is, therefore, in 
general indeterminant on a prior grounds. If, 
however, the utility function exhibits constant risk 
aversion and the production function is Cobb-
Douglas or CES then some sufficient conditions for 
the determination of the sign of xr l can be 
identified. 
If the utility function has constant risk 
aversion, Equation 2.3, then Nand D can be written 
Some of the sufficient conditions for the determina-
tion of the sign of xr 1 can be identified for some 
values of (J by taking the limit of xrl as (] goes to 
zero. As (] goes to zero Xl goes to the risk neutral 
solution and Nand D go to 
b 
limit N = f (pgl-w I) fr(s,r)ds 
a 
(]-+O 
b 
limit D = pf gIl f(s ,r)ds 
a 
0-+ 0 
thus 
limit Xl = 
r 
8 ... 0 
b f gil f(s ,r)ds 
a 
....... (2.35) 
which is Equation 1. 9. Thus in the limit as 8 goes 
to zero the derivative xr 1 for the risk aversion case 
goes to the solution for the risk neutral case, and 
s-ince these functions are continuous in e there 
existssoine neighborhood of zero for which the risk 
neutral solution. holds. This implies that if the 
utility function is not "too" risk averse then· the risk 
neutral analysis holds. In addition if it does not 
hold for all constant risk aversion utility functions, 
then the value of e is a determinant of the sign of 
xr
l
. It was proven in the risk neutral chapter that if 
the production function is Cobb-Douglas then 
Equat ion 2.35 is negative. If the production 
function is CES then xr I can be either positive or 
negative; however either e>O or EYX2 < 112 are 
sufficient for it to be negative. 
The effect upon E(rr). The effect of an increase 
in risk upon the expected level of profits is analyzed 
by differentiating the expected profit function. The 
procedure used for expected utility is not sufficient 
since expected profits are not maximized. The 
expected profit function shifts down as risk 
increases since this function is concave; however, 
since Xl changes as risk changes the possibility 
exists that we shift to a point on the lower function 
with a higher expected profit. 
The expected profit function is 
rb . 
E(n) = J'l (pg(x l ,(1+s)zO-w l x l )f(s,r)ds a 
... . ...... . (2.36) 
Differentiating this function with respect to r yields 
b 
Er(;:) = x: Ia (pgl -W I) f(s,r)ds 
b 
+ f (pg-w 1 XI) fr(s ,r)ds .. . . . (2.37) 
a 
The second righthand integral is negative since the 
profit function is concave in s . In general the sign 
of the first term is indeterminant. It was 
demonstrated in connection with Equation 2.13a 
that the integral of this term is positive (negative) if 
gZl is positive (negative); thus this term will have 
the same (opposite) sign as xr I if g21 is positive 
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(negative). However, in general the sign of xr I is 
indeterminant. If we let the utility function exhibit 
constant risk aversion and let 8 go to zero this term 
and Er (rr) are both determinant. In the limit as 8 
goes to zero the integral of the first term goes to 
zero since it becomes the first order condition. 
Thus for e "close" to zero Er("IT) is negative since 
the second term is negative. 
The effect upon E(y). We next analyze the 
effect of an increase in risk upon the mean level of 
output. This is achieved by examining the partial 
derivative of the expected value of the solution level 
of output with respect to r. The expected level of 
output is given by 
b 
E(y) = f g(x ,(1 +s)zo) f(s ,r)ds 
a I 
.... (2.38) 
and the partial derivative of E(y) with respect to r , 
treating Xl as the solution value is 
b b 
Er(Y) = x:! gl f(s,r)ds + J g f/s ,r)ds 
a a 
............ (2.39) 
The integral in the first term is positive; thus the 
sign of this term agrees with the sign of xr 1. The 
second term is negative since.8 is concave in s. Thus 
a sufficient condition for Er(y) to be negative i~ xr 1 
negative. If xr I is positive then the sign of Er(y) is 
indeterminant since the two terms disagree in sign. 
The effect upon wz. The next analysis is that 
of the effect of an increase in r upon the price of 
water. In this analysis as in many of the others the 
effect for the general case is indeterminant; 
however, for special cases the sign of the effect can 
be determined. In these special cases we analyze 
the sign of the partial derivative of W z with respect 
to r for e "close" to zero. For these cases the 
conclusions are the same as those for the risk 
neutral case and were analyzed in connection with 
Equation 1.17. 
As in the earlier analyses of impacts upon the 
price of water, we assume that competition among 
the Sl farmers competes Wz to a level such that 
... . , . (2.40) 
Differentiating Equation 2.40 with respect to r, 
treating Xl as a function of r yields 
b 
w: = ~: fa pglZ Ul (1T) f(s,r)ds 
b 
+ x: 1: (pgz-WZ)(Pgl -W1)U"(1T) f(s,r)ds 
f(s,r)ds ................. (2.41) 
The sign of this expression is not implied by the 
assumed characteristics ofU and g; thus in general 
this sign is indeterminant. If we assume a constant 
risk aversion utility function then Equation 2.41 
becomes 
f(s,r)ds .................. (2.42) 
The sign of Equation 2.42 is also indeterminant 
from the a priori conditions on g. However, in the 
limit as (J goes to zero w r z goes to 
b 
limit w~ = x: p r gl z f( s,r )ds (} .. o J a . 
b 
= p (x~ f. gl Z f(s,r)ds 
b 
+ f. gz fr(s,r)dV ........ (2.43) 
which is the same result that was given in 
Equation 1.17. 
Since the functions are continuous in (J there 
is an interval about zero for which the risk neutral 
results describe the risk aversion case. The sign of 
Equation 2.43 is also in general indeterminant; 
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however, it was proven above that if the production 
function is Cob b-Douglas then w r z is negative or if 
it is CES with e>O (0)1) then wl is ,negative. 
The effect upon W3. The analysis of the effect 
of a change in risk upon the price of land, W3, is 
I very similar to that of wz. We examine the sign of 
w r 3 which in general is indeterminant. If we assume 
that the utility function exhibits constant risk 
. a version and let (J go to zero in the limit this case 
,again approaches the risk neutral case. We assume 
competition yields a W3 such that 
b fa (p~ -W3)U1(1T) f(s,r)ds = 0 ....... (2.44) 
Differentiating Equation 2.44 with respect to r 
yields 
b ~ = (x~ fa pgl 3 U I (1T) f(s,r)ds 
b 
+ 1: (Pg3 -W3 ) UI (1T) 
b 
fr(s,r)dV /fa Ul (1T) f(s,r)ds . .. (2.45) 
The sign of Equation 2.45 is indeterminant given 
the assumed characteristics of U and g. If, 
however, we assume a constant risk aversion utility 
function and take the limit of w r 3 as (J goes to zero 
we get 
b 
limit ~ = p (x: Ia pg 1 3 f( s,r )ds 
(J .. O 
b 
+ fa g3 fr(s,r)ds) ......... (2.46) 
which is the same as Equation 1.23. The 
conclusions of the analysis of Equation 1.23 was 
that in general its sign is indeterminant; however, if 
the production function is Cobb-Douglas or CES 
with the elasticity of production with respect to X2 
less than one-half, then wr3 is negative. Since the 
above functions are continuous in (J there exists 
some interval above zero for which these conclu-
sions hold for risk aversion case. 
Summary of Case II 
In this section we examined the effects of risk 
aversion and the effects of an increase in risk upon 
several important economic variables. In both 
analyses we examined the effects upon expected 
profits, the level of the purchased input (xv, 
expected output, and the prices of water and land. 
In the analysis of an increase in risk we also 
examined its impact upon the expected level of real 
income (utility). 
In Table 5 we summarize the results of the 
analysis of the effects of risk aversion. In that 
analysis we compared the risk aversion solution to 
the risk neutral solution and we differentiated the 
variables with respect to the "degree" of risk 
aversion, (). The two analyses yielded very similar 
results; however the partial derivatives of the price 
of water, w ()z, and of the price of land, w () 3, with 
respect to () were determinant only for () "close" to 
zero. In the table a minus sign that is unqualified 
indicates that the variable is negative. A sign with a 
qualification indicates that the condition(s) is (are) 
sufficient for the sign to hold. 
The two parts of the table are very similar and 
only the portion related to the partial derivatives 
will be discussed here. An increase in risk aversion 
will lower expected profits. The precautionary 
actions of risk averters will lower expected profits. 
These actions, however, may either increase or 
decrease the quantity of the purchased input and 
expected output. This can cause the price of water 
to fall or maybe to rise. The price of land can either 
increase or decrease. If, however, the production 
function is Cobb-Douglas the ambiguity just 
Tab!e 5. Summary of the effects of risk aversion. 
Production Function 
Variable Concave Cobb-Douglas CES 
- if a 
+ifb 
- if a 
+ifb 
- if c - if d 
- if f 
+ifg 
discussed disappears. All of these effects are 
negative (w () z and w () 3 hold for () "close" to zero). 
And if the production function is CES the effects 
are all negative with some qualifications. A 
negative sign on w () z and w () 3 hold for () "close" to 
zero and certain values of the parameters of the 
production function. 
Table 6 summarizes the results of the analysis 
of an increase in risk. In this analysis the variables 
were differentiated partially with respect to r where 
Table 6. Summary of the effects of an Increase In 
risk. 
Variable Concave 
E (lh 
r 
- if d and e E/rr) + if d and f 
xl 
- if d 
r 
E/y) - if d and e 
z 
w 
r 
w 3 
r 
a) 0 <€ <V2 YX2 
b) 0 < p < 1 
1-€ 
YX2 
c) p < 
1-2€ 
YX2 
<0 
Production Function 
Cobb-Douglas CES 
- if a and d 
- if d or band d 
+ if c and d 
- if d - if d 
- if d - if a and d 
or band d 
- if d - if band d 
- if a and d 
- if d or band d 
+ if c and d 
d) () "close" to zero 
e)g221<0 
Production Function 
Variable Concave Cobb-Douglas CES 
E()(rr) 
1 - if a 
x() + ifb 
E()(y) - if a +ifb 
z 
w() - if c and e -ife - if d and e 
3 - if e and f 
- if e w() + if e and g - if e 
a) g21 > 0 d) a> l-€yx 
2 
g) g 1 2 and g 1 3 disagree in sign 
and g23 < 0 
b) g21 < 0 
c) gsz > 0 
e) () "close" to zero 
f) g12 and g 13 agree in sign 
andg23 > 0 
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r is the shift parameter in the density function. An 
increase in r causes a shift of the density function 
that has the characteristics of a mean preserving 
spread. An increase in risk will lower real income 
(expected utility) for the Sl set of farmers. This is 
not too surprising since it simply says that risk 
averters are made worse off by an increase in risk, 
which is true by definition. The other effects are 
indeterminant except in the limit as e goes to zero. 
In the limit as e goes to zero the results go to the 
risk neutral results. Since the functions are 
continuous in e there exists an interval about zero 
for which the risk neutral results hold for risk 
averters. That is, if the utility function is not "too" 
risk averse then the risk neutral conclusions hold. 
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If the risk neutral conclusions do not hold for all 
risk averters then the degree of risk aversion 
becomes a determinant of the sign of the partial 
derivatives. 
For e "close" to zero expected profits fall as 
risk increases. The quantity of the purchased input 
and the mean level of output will decrease 
(increase) if gZ21 is negative (positive), and in 
general the sign on wl and wr3 are indeterminant. 
However, if the production function is Cobb-
Douglas all of the above partial derivatives are 
negative for () "close" to zero. If the production 
function is CES then for () "close" to zero the 
values of the parameters affect the signs. 
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